Are there known techniques to obfuscate IDS rules, so they can't be easily used by attackers to reverse-engineer the vulnerability that they detect?
Let me provide some context. Sometimes IDS vendors become aware of a zero-day vulnerability (one that has not yet been publicly disclosed). In that situation, one can create a rule to detect exploitation of that vulnerability and push it out to everyone, to try to prevent exploitation of the vulnerability... but this incurs a new risk. In particular, an attacker might be able to analyze the IDS rule and use that to gain some clues that make it easier for the attacker to identify the vulnerability and start using it to attack other systems. So, in a world where some people are slow to patch and don't use the IDS, there's the risk that pushing out such a new rule might (perversely) increase overall exploitation of the zero-day vulnerability, rather than decreasing it.
Are there any known techniques to mitigate this risk, and make it harder for attackers to learn anything useful from new IDS rules? For instance, is there a way to distribute the IDS rule in an obfuscated or encrypted form, so end users can still use it to detect attacks but attackers who aren't already familiar with the vulnerability can't use the rule to re-discover the vulnerability and start attacking others?