That depends entirely on the cryptographic algorithm used. One of Claude Shannon's maxims was that errors should not propagate. In the case of AES in CBC mode, a single bit error will propagate to two blocks.
Modern cryptosystems are likely to use a digest or other message integrity mechanism to detect tampering, so that in case of an error in the encrypted data, the entire ciphertext will be rejected on the basis that a mismatched digest suggests tampering.
Modern computing hardware is so robust that it probably doesn't make sense to worry much about errors. if error correction is an important consideration, then data should have error-correcting codes added before encryption. In that way, errors in the decrypted data can be corrected. However, if decrypted data is accepted despite a non-matching digest, then tampering can no longer be detected.
Edit: Now that I think about it a {ahem} bit, a bit error in encrypted data is no more likely than a bit error in plaintext. If you accept that a single-bit error renders an entire physical block of the disk unreadable, then a bit error in encrypted data the propagates to the next 128-bit block (AES, CBC) will also result in loss of a single 512-byte disk block 31 out of 32 times, and at most two physical disk blocks in the 1/32 case that's left. Unless I've missed something in the probabilities, for 512-byte physical blocks, a bit-error in encryption corrupts one block 97% of the time and two blocks the remaining 3% of the time.
If you also accept that a single unreadable physical block means the file is effectively destroyed, then there's no error-rate penalty for encryption.
In any case, one defends against unreadable ciphertext in the same way one defends against unreadable plaintext: RAID and backup copies of files, being physically careful of disk drives, etc.