I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding in this question. HTTPS does not provide reliable authenticity. The use of Domain Validation by CAs helps to ensure that the certificate corresponds to the domain, but if you go to citti.com when you meant to go to citi.com, caveat emptor! AFAIK, the risk of MITM attacks involving a false certificate has been limited to the realm of the theoretical, but exploits have been demonstrated.
For this reason, Extended Value Certificates were created. The idea is that the CA owner performs deeper validation that the request for a certificate is coming form the appropriate, authorized party for the domain. In principle, this provides a higher assurance that the particular certificate is trustworthy. When a browser see an EV Cert, it adds a green field with the corporation's name to the address bar. Users are supposed to learn to expect this and not proceed without it. I do not believe this has been adequately communicated to the general public, so much of the potential value is not realized.
It must be recognized that EV Certs are not, at heart, a technical control. They are dependent on users' knowledge and actions. In this sense, even with EV Certs, HTTPS is not a reliable source of authenticity, IMO. None the less, it has great value and users who do look for EV certs and prefer sites that use them do get substantial value.