Unless the Superfish malware has been installed on your system, (which it might if you bought a Lenovo machine,) you don't have to worry. This attack worked because the secret it revealed was necessary for the malware to hijack the data; it is not a part of how legitimate certificates are authenticated.
It helps to understand the relationships between a certificate, a public key, and a private key. A private key is a secret number used to sign messages with digital signatures (or to encrypt web traffic), and it has a matching public key that can be used to verify those signatures. A certificate is a public document that contains a public key; web site owners put their public keys onto certificates and send them to companies called Certificate Authorities (CAs) who digitally sign them to prove their certificates are genuine. The digital signatures ensure the document has not been changed, assuring you the public key it contains is the genuine key of the site you're visiting.
CAs are companies everyone agrees to trust to only sign certificates from legitimate sources. They also have a private and public key pair. They keep the private key very secret, locked in a secure cryptographic device called a Hardware Security Module (HSM) and they restrict access to it so it can only be used to sign a customer's certificate when the customer generates a new key. But in order to be useful, everyone on the web needs to know their public keys. So these CAs put their own public key on a special certificate and sign it with their own private key ("self-signing"). They then send these self-signed "root certificates" to the browser vendors and OS vendors, who include them with their products. A real CA would never, ever, send out their private keys!
The trusted authority root certificates are the documents that validate all the certificates of all the connections your computer makes. Thus, your computer has to trust them. This malware is installing an untrustworthy certificate in a position of ultimate trust, compromising the security of the machine by allowing anyone who knows this key to forge a certificate for any site, hiding evidence of their tampering.
The malware abuses its position by generating phony public and private keys for every site you visit; after you connect it injects its payload into the web site's page. In order for your browser to trust these phony keys and not give you warnings, the malware generates a forged certificate that tricks your browser into believing the keys are legitimate. But like any certificate, the forgery needs to be signed by a trusted CA. To sign, the malware needs a public and private key, just like a real CA. Because the phony CA is forging these certificates right inside your computer, the private key needs to be inside your computer as well. It's impossible to keep such things secret from the owner of the computer, but they tried by taking some rudimentary steps to hide it. The blog you linked to described how he uncovered the secret.
No legitimate certificate authority would ever allow their private key to be leaked, much less send it out to a bunch of random computer owners. There was a case where a certificate authority had their secret key leaked; their reputation was ruined and they went bankrupt in a month. Since your computer doesn't contain the private keys of the legitimate certificate authorities, there is no secret for an attacker to crack.
komodia. Expect exploits soon. Anything that uses Komodia software is vulnerable to the attack (Qustodio, Keep my Child Secure, etc.)
mitmproxy) will generate a key pair which is unique to the host.