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As far as I know, when I am creating a new file or directory in a directory that can be written by multiple users (and thus an adversary can have made a symlink there), the only way to protect myself from symlink race is creating a file with enough random name.

Well, some app might have checked if such file already exists, but I am not aware of any mechanism that is both atomic and able to detect symlinks.

So, when there are many non-random (or even reused) filenames in /tmp from various apps, it means all these apps are vulnerable to symlink race, doesn't it? (Well, it can't be simply decided if the vulnerability can be easily abused, but I don't care about practical exploitability for now.)

I hope I must be somewhere wrong.

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  • Have you investigated mktemp?
    – MattBianco
    Commented Mar 5, 2015 at 10:08
  • 1
    @MattBianco Sure, it is just an implementation of "creating a file with enough random name". Unfortunately, it seems that there are many apps that don't use it.
    – v6ak
    Commented Mar 5, 2015 at 10:10
  • 1
    There's you answer then. It is as common as there are bad implementations of tempfile creation. One way of atomically creating a file is by (hard)linking to it with (ln without -s). Only one process will succeed in creating the link.
    – MattBianco
    Commented Mar 5, 2015 at 10:14
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    open(..., O_EXCL|O_CREAT) you could also use fd=open and fstat(fd to check if file is a link without having the race condition.
    – domen
    Commented Mar 5, 2015 at 11:29
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    @Infinite good catch. I wasn't clear enough. open with O_NOFOLLOW, then fstat to tell you if it's a symlink.
    – domen
    Commented Jan 20, 2017 at 20:16

1 Answer 1

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So this should answer the question of "is symlink common?"

A search on the MITRE database shows there are 4 CVEs for a Linux Symlink Race condition vulnerability. For comparison, there are 2749 Linux CVEs known to MITRE.

Linux at the kernel level has protections against this. Kees Cook created a patch for Linux to prevent this problem:

The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.

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