There is no formal problem, from a cryptographic point of view, in reuse of the same DH parameters (modulus and generators) by multiple people. What the recent Logjam attack highlights is that if the modulus is so small that it can be broken in practice, then the attacker can reuse most of the attack effort for subsequent breakages of DH instances that use the same parameters. In that sense, it can be argued that sharing the same DH parameters with the rest of the Internet increases the consequences of a successful cryptanalytic break; however, it can be equally argued (and, in my opinion, more convincingly) that the real problem is using the same weak modulus as everybody else lies in the "weak", not in the "same". If you use a properly generated 2048-bit modulus then no breakage shall occur at all, and sharing is harmless.
You may notice that elliptic curve variants of Diffie-Hellman commonly use the extremely widespread P-256 curve, so that's Internet-wide sharing, and that does not appear to be a problem. Arjen Lenstra once told me that it made that curve a "big, fat target", and I agree with him, but, right now, there is no known way to break that curve in realistic time. (Everybody uses the same curve because producing your own curve is not very easy, and also because specializing implementations for a single curve grants some extra performance.)