According to scuzzy-delta, yes:
It is possible to detect that someone on your network is using Tor (e.g. You're a network administrator at a workplace, and an employee is using it), and the fact that you're using it is in itself interesting information.
Using a bridged TOR connection is a safer bet but by no means the definition of safe, closer to gambling actually. The reason for this is they are meant to circumvent cencorship, if one bridge doesn't work for you in e.g. Iran you try another until you find one that's not blocked yet. However, I assume all bridged connections will work in lands of freedom, and therefore you have no idea what bridge connections your admin is aware of.
Diving deeper, this is an excerpt from https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges.html.en
Over the last few years, censors have found ways to block Tor even when clients are using bridges. They usually do this by installing special boxes at ISPs that peek into network traffic and detect Tor; when Tor is detected they block the traffic flow.
To circumvent such sophisticated censorship Tor introduced pluggable transports. These transports manipulate all Tor traffic between the client and its first hop such that it is not identifiable as a Tor connection. If the censor can't decide if the connection is a Tor connection, then they are less likely to block it.
If anyone can pitch in on the missing piece, is "obfs3, scramblesuit, fte, and obfs4" ample obfuscation then?