Linked Questions

50 votes
9 answers
56k views

Is making a clean install enough to remove potential malware?

Is formatting the disk and reinstalling the system from scratch (to Ubuntu) enough to remove any potential hidden software spyware, keyloggers etc.? Or can something still persist installed in the ...
Strapakowsky's user avatar
  • 3,089
56 votes
8 answers
45k views

How reliable is a write protection switch on a USB flash drive?

I'm currently using a USB flash drive with a live distribution. At times I would plug it into terminals I cannot trust. My threat model here is solely the risk of unauthorized modifications to the ...
Karol J. Piczak's user avatar
53 votes
3 answers
37k views

How does the TPM perform integrity measurements on a system?

I am trying to find out how the TPM performs an integrity measurement on a system. It is well-documented in the TPM specification how it seals the data it has measured in the PCRs and how it is ...
user1049697's user avatar
  • 1,147
29 votes
2 answers
59k views

Right way to use the TPM for full disk encryption

I'm currently setting up a BitLocker equivalent using a TPM and LUKS. I've got the basics right and I'm able to measure the boot process and seal the FDE key using the TPM. Every time the sensitive ...
André Borie's user avatar
  • 12.8k
18 votes
2 answers
11k views

Can BIOS malware be installed from OS?

Can an OS vulnerability be exploited to install BIOS/UEFI/firmware malware (such as a keylogger)? I know BIOS is a "deeper" level than the OS. I know firmware based keyloggers exist. I know they can ...
Emma's user avatar
  • 181
10 votes
2 answers
2k views

How to circumvent compromised CPUs in major FOSS operating systems

As Matthew Green puts it, "the NSA has been ... Working with hardware ... vendors to weaken encryption and random number generators." At this stage, however, there is little public knowledge of which ...
sampablokuper's user avatar
10 votes
1 answer
3k views

What prevents the Intel TXT boot loader from being maliciously altered?

From my understanding of Intel TXT, the technology can be used to put the processor in a trusted state where measurements can be performed. My understanding looks something like this, where I believe ...
Nark's user avatar
  • 549
7 votes
2 answers
2k views

For remotely unlocking LUKS volumes via SSH, how can I verify integrity before sending passphrase?

Although this is closely related to the recently closed question Evil maids in the server room [closed], I believe that it's more answerable. I'd like to unlock LUKS volumes on remotely hosted ...
mirimir's user avatar
  • 736
2 votes
2 answers
2k views

Security and Veracrypt [closed]

I have a few questions about Security and Veracrypt and hope you can clarify it for me. I don't want the VeraCrypt hidden volume I created to be damaged. If I mount the hidden volume and transfer ...
Guest's user avatar
  • 21
6 votes
0 answers
435 views

Security of TPM 1.2 for providing tamper-evidence against firmware modification

I would like to use a TPM for providing tamper-evidence to my workstation, using SRTM (Static Root-of-Trust for Measurement). Currently, I plan to have the TPM seal a one-time value which only I know, ...
guest's user avatar
  • 219
0 votes
0 answers
131 views

Are modern CPUs or SOCs stateless?

According to this older post: https://security.stackexchange.com/a/174968/271114 Intel processors are stateless. Nowadays a "CPU" is often a SOC integrating neural engines, GPUs, ...
halp's user avatar
  • 1