Passwort rotation policies are in place to reduce specific risks which allow an attacker to get (and use) the users password. These risks are password reuse, credential phishing or other forms of social attacks to get the password, compromise of a server and thus access to the hashed passwords or brute forcing.
None of these risks really apply for physical locks, i.e. there is no reuse of the same key for other places, no remote credential stealing using phishing, no compromise of a central server to access all the keys and no practical brute force attacks. Loss or stealing a key is still possible but much different from a phished key since the person is no longer in access of the key. Cloning of a key requires temporarily physical access to the key and thus is much harder to do undetected. And in all cases even the use of the key requires physical access to the specific lock and cannot be done from remote or from somewhere in the local network.
In other words: the risks with physical keys are different and can be contained in other ways, like having hard to clone keys or having cameras on the most sensitive locks which to monitor who is opening the lock. Moreover physical locks and keys might have additional risks which passwords don't have, like being vulnerable to (often easy) lock picking without the need of the original key. Rotation does not really protect against these new risks either.