Some implementations of TLS 1.0 did not properly validate the padding as required by the TLS specification. This led to a situation in which the POODLE bug could be leveraged against TLS 1.0, despite the fact that it *should* be secure against the attack. Later versions of TLS (i.e. 1.1 and 1.2) are inherently secure against POODLE and other padding oracle issues because they authenticate the encrypted message (CBC-then-MAC) rather than authenticating the plaintext (MAC-then-CBC).

As far as I know, the only major implementations affected are in equipment from F5 Networks, A10 Networks, and Cisco. The [SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/) scanner checks for the bug, but it can only target internet-facing IPs. The Windows SSL stack, as far as I can tell, properly implements the padding checks in TLS 1.0 and therefore isn't vulnerable to the TLS variant of POODLE. As such, you shouldn't need to do anything.