If the webmaster of any site you visit knows the algorithm above, it becomes possible for them to mount a brute force attack on your master password from the generated password. So for this to be a viable scheme the master password would probably have to be a long string of randomness (which would probably defeat the purpose of the scheme), or the device generating the passwords would have to have a long random key that was unlocked by the master password.
It is unclear how the "salt" fits in this - if it is random, how do you know what salt to use for a particular site? If it isn't (ie it is a fixed secret), how does it differ from the master password in nature?
If you have random salt and you are storing it on the generating device, you might as well be generating the whole password randomly and storing it protected on the device (like Keepass et al). As a practical matter this has an advantage that you have a record of all the site names you have keys for. Without that, it becomes difficult to remember what the canonical name for a site is. For example are you going to refer to this site as "IT Security Stack Exchange", "Security StackExchange", "Security", "security.stackexchange.com", "www.security.stackexchange.com", or "user29349.openidprovider.com"...?