## CVE-2014-6271 ##

[CVE-2014-6271](https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-6271) was the first vulnerability discovered. A patch can be found [here](https://gist.github.com/drj11/e85ca2d7503f28ebfde8).

From wikipedia explanation:

> Function definitions are exported by encoding them within the
> environment variable list as variables whose values begin with
> parentheses ("()") followed by a function definition. The new instance
> of Bash, upon starting, scans its environment variable list for values
> in this format and converts them back into internal functions.
>
> Bash performs this conversion by creating a fragment of code that
> defines the function and executing it, but it **does not verify that the
> fragment is merely a function definition**. Therefore anyone who can
> cause Bash to execute with a particular name/value pair in its
> environment, can also execute arbitrary commands by appending those
> commands to an exported function definition.

In the source code, we can see this in [`variables.c`](http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/tree/variables.c?id=ac50fbac377e32b98d2de396f016ea81e8ee9961#n315):

    /* Initialize the shell variables from the current environment.
       If PRIVMODE is nonzero, don't import functions from ENV or
       parse $SHELLOPTS. */
    void
    initialize_shell_variables (env, privmode)
         char **env;
         int privmode;
    {
      [...]
      for (string_index = 0; string = env[string_index++]; )
        {
    
          [...]
          /* If exported function, define it now.  Don't import functions from
    	 the environment in privileged mode. */
          if (privmode == 0 && read_but_dont_execute == 0 && STREQN ("() {", string, 4))
    	  {
            [...]
    	    parse_and_execute (temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST);
            [...]
          }
    }

We can see a for loop over all the environment variables given to the function, and then an if about whether we are in privileged mode, but that is disabled most times.
The "not verify that the fragment is merely a function definition" vulnerability is in the `parse_and_execute` line. The function description from [`builtins/evalstring.c`](http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/tree/builtins/evalstring.c?id=ac50fbac377e32b98d2de396f016ea81e8ee9961#n178):

    /* Parse and execute the commands in STRING.  Returns whatever
       execute_command () returns.  This frees STRING.  FLAGS is a
       flags word; look in common.h for the possible values.  Actions
       are:
       	(flags & SEVAL_NONINT) -> interactive = 0;
       	(flags & SEVAL_INTERACT) -> interactive = 1;
       	(flags & SEVAL_NOHIST) -> call bash_history_disable ()
       	(flags & SEVAL_NOFREE) -> don't free STRING when finished
       	(flags & SEVAL_RESETLINE) -> reset line_number to 1
    */
    int
    parse_and_execute (string, from_file, flags)
         char *string;
         const char *from_file;
         int flags;
    {

The patch introduces flags `SEVAL_FUNCDEF` and `SEVAL_ONECMD` that can be passed in the flags field to `parse_and_execute`:

    + #define SEVAL_FUNCDEF	0x080		/* only allow function definitions */
    + #define SEVAL_ONECMD	0x100		/* only allow a single command */

The patch also adds functionality to `parse_and_execute` to comply with those new flags, and changes the call to `parse_and_execute` to pass those flags:

    -     parse_and_execute (temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST);
    + 	  /* Don't import function names that are invalid identifiers from the
    + 	     environment. */
    + 	  if (legal_identifier (name))
    +       parse_and_execute (temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST|SEVAL_FUNCDEF|SEVAL_ONECMD);