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956 / 16000*106 = 45.94, not 459.4. You forgot a zero: that's 16 billions hashes per second, not 1.6 billions. The actual figure is, as Jeff says, "nearly" 16000 millions, which means "a bit less" -- …

John the Ripper supports parallelization. This uses OpenMP or MPI. All of this is open source.

To complete @Terry's answer: MD5 is thoroughly broken for collisions, but only very slightly weakened for preimages and second preimages. … However, replacing MD5 for integrity checks is not a critical emergency; no need to get all worried on it. …

But you will also notice an apparently endless stream of people who want to use MD5, or suggest MD5, or begin to ask themselves questions about MD5 and are in search of some guidance. … But the Web is full of MD5; therefore, most applications will be full of MD5 as well -- and, because of point #4 above, the Web will be even fuller of MD5. …

That MD5 is "broken" has no bearing here. MD5 is broken for collisions and collisions do not have any impact on your situation. What could be a worry is length extension attacks. … This is because MD5 is a Merkle-Damgård function. …

The only property of the salt is to be unique -- really unique, i.e. each hashed password has its own value (that's not one salt per server, but one salt per user, and a new one when the user changes …

In the second, you don't include the newline character, which mimics what OS X md5 utility does with the argument -s. …

For instance, you could interpret the MD5 value as a big integer, and encode that in base 10. … The corresponding Java code would look like this: // MD5 output is a byte[], in variable md5out String result = new BigInteger(1, md5out).ToString(); Since MD5 output is 16 bytes, the resulting integer …

Hashing is not encryption (it is hashing), so we do not "decrypt" MD5 hashes, since they were not "encrypted" in the first place. … So cracking a MD5 hash is about trying potential inputs (passwords) until a match is found. …

Though SHA-256 nominally offers a 256-bit output, no weakness about it is known when the output is truncated to 128 bits, except, of course, weaknesses inherent to the shorter output length; e.g. coll …

MD5's resistance to preimages is (almost) as good as new. … The known collision attacks on MD5 demonstrate that MD5's compression function is not a PRF; however, this does not break HMAC/MD5. This just breaks the security proof. …

MD5 is broken (for collisions). SHA-1 is not (at least, not as much). If your protocol requires resistance to collisions, then don't use MD5. … A contrario, MD5 collisions can be generated in less than one second on a basic PC. SHA-1 is slightly slower than MD5 when processing bulk data, which does not matter as much as is usually believed. …

"MD5(SHA-1(password))" is more secure than "MD5(password)" in the following sense: computing SHA-1 then MD5 on a candidate password takes about 2.5x the time it takes to compute only MD5 on the same password … It still is pathetically weak, for two reasons: 2.5x slower than a single MD5 is still awfully fast. …

So we could say that MD5 uses "four rounds" (per block). … In that view, MD5 has 64 rounds. …

The definition of a cryptographic hash function includes resistance to preimages: given h(x), it should be infeasible to recover x. A hash function being "reversible" is the exact opposite of that pro …