50

Google has access (obviously). The police will have access if they have a valid search warrant. A national security letter will give the FBI secret access. Various three-letter agencies may have access, depending on how they're doing at circumventing Google's encryption. (Google started encrypting its internal traffic after it was revealed that the NSA was ...


46

As mentioned in the comments, I too agree 4 hours in a month is way too low. Understand, and more importantly, make your stakeholders understand that with 4h they shouldn't expect much. Considering they've given you 4h, it doesn't look like they're serious about securing this application either. Based on the comments, answers and my own thoughts I'll try to ...


39

... but they used their own infrastructure It's not really their own infrastructure what they use. They use instead botnets consisting of hijacked systems. These are systems which they p0wn but definitely not own. And thus it is very cheap for them. Apart from that any VPS provider who would rent their VPS for DDoS attacks would quickly lose reputation ...


37

Your threat model is focused on external parties breaking in. But the threats are broader than that. Low-level hardware backups, VM snapshots, and disposed hardware can all contain data. And because these things tend to be seen to have lower risks, they are often mishandled. So, it's not a "Mission Impossible" style of threat that is likely. It's ...


27

Start with the Azure top security best practices so you can maintain and improve security of your Azure solution step by step: agree and upgrade your Azure subscription to Azure Security Center Standard. This will help you find and fix security vulnerabilities, apply access and application controls to block malicious activity, detect threats using analytics,...


24

Amazon claims that AWS VPC is "logically isolated" from the other AWS instances, and from the Internet. "Logically" means that it is done in software, not with dedicated hardware system. An AWS VPC can be connected to your VPN and it will use IPsec for that external connection, but this does not mean that internally IPsec is used. In fact, how the "isolation"...


21

From a purely technical perspective, if you encrypt it properly before you upload it, and it stays encrypted all the time it is in the cloud, then the data is very safe. However, there are very probably extra levels of legal compliance you need to meet. This is "Personally Identifiable Information" and there are a lot of laws and regulations that apply to ...


19

Given the current state of public cloud, I would argue that in many cases it is in fact more secure than on-premise storage. Granted I work for Microsoft, but my opinion both pre-dates my employment, and extends to competitors like Amazon and Google as well. Companies whose business models are built on data center operational expertise and excellence, are ...


18

Highly customized and patched hypervisors, sandboxes around said hypervisors to mitigate breakouts, and heavy monitoring. Of course, any given server only hosts so many VMs, so a breakout is fundamentally limited to a finite number of guests, if it's able to get past the protections outside the hypervisor. For example, QEMU can be compiled with a hardened ...


15

Not instantly. Although, that's what I want to believe. What you could do is the following. Download the Truecrypt version 7.1a and create an encrypted storage file (option 1 from the wizard) and choose 3 algorithm based encryption with a SHA-512 key. Put all your sensitive files in here and upload the encrypted file to Google Drive. When you want to work ...


14

That's a judgment call you'll have to make for yourself, but their technical overview has what I consider a huge red flag: Which data is stored on the Boxcryptor Key Server Private RSA key (encrypted with the user's password) The fact that your private key is stored on their server, even if it's encrypted with your password, greatly weakens ...


14

"The Cloud" is marketing speak for "Other People's Servers". I will use that term for the rest of this post. When you store your data on other people's servers, those people are technically capable to look at your files and also show them to anyone who asks. Whether or not they are allowed to look at them and/or let others look at them should be described ...


10

You'll never be able to know. You can however, exercise reasoning and logical judgement based on The company's ToS. The company's track record. Your trust of the company providing that service. The importance/value of the data handled by that service. Regarding password management; call me a little paranoid, but I really never trust any cloud service with ...


10

If it is a catch-all address, they don't need the actual address. The entire point of a catch-all e-mail address is that it catches all mail that would otherwise be undeliverable. If you have thisIsMySuperSecretEmail@my-domain.com set as the catch-all, then if I sent an e-mail to bob@my-domain.com, you would get the message in the super secret mailbox ...


10

Any data you upload to Google Drive (or Skydrive, or Dropbox for that matter) should be considered duplicated by the NSA. Apart from arbitrary queries from the aforementioned secret service, law enforcement agencies from any country may gain access to them through legal means (subpoenas and so on). And of course, Google engineers could in theory browse your ...


10

In my opinion, Lastpass is referring to the Firefox password manager insecure when the user is not using master password for Firefox. Which won't be apples-to-apples comparison. Firefox uses 3DES for storing passwords and in case master password is not set, null ("") is used, which is insecure for sure. To read in detail about how Chrome, IE and ...


10

The best way that I've found to execute commands on the underlying host with an exposed Docker socket is Ian Miell's most pointless docker command ever The command looks like this :- docker run -ti --privileged --net=host --pid=host --ipc=host --volume /:/host busybox chroot /host and will essentially drop you straight into a full ...


9

(Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer; don't try this at home.) The U.S. government does have very specific guidelines for government agencies wanting to consume cloud services. Those cloud services must be FedRAMP certified. This is an arduous, lengthy, expensive process... and it's specifically geared toward cloud services, not managed or shared hosting. Per ...


9

Cloud based DoS attacks are possible, and they do happen from time to time. But it's not a very popular option for a couple of reasons: Initial setup - Deploying hundreds of VMs is not an easy feat, and paying for them isn't simple either. However if you're using someone else's VM, then this makes things a lot easier. Detection - Many providers including ...


9

Spectre is far harder to use than Meltdown. In a cloud hosting situation, an attacker needs to know: What software the target is using Where in memory that software is Where in memory the target data is The behavior of the host CPU's branch predictor The behavior of the host CPU's speculative execution system and possibly some other things I'm forgetting ...


9

This is a very out-of-left field answer (aka it has little to do with actual security), so feel free to ignore my advice. This question itself is fairly opinion-based, so I thought I'd try a completely different "kind" of answer. You've been put in charge of application security. This is a good thing! Unfortunately, your employer has very ...


8

Cloud hosting is simply shared hosting with virtual machines. There's nothing particularly unique or magical about it; you can simply substitute the concept of "shared hosting" for "cloud hosting" and work out the details there. Typically doing your own examination of a hosting provider's setup isn't going to be an option, so you'll have to rely on their ...


8

Cloud are external service providers: you do not have control on their system, you do not known their internal tools, policy, you do not know their employee. The best bet is therefore to assume cloud is insecure and just encrypt the file before uploading them. This way, from a confidentiality and integrity perspective, you are not bound to trust the cloud ...


8

If you have access to email sent from those domains, the headers will contain a wealth of information that will help you determine where they're hosted. The downside is that, unlike poking at their public MX records, you'll need to get actual email from someone there in order to get headers to examine. The Received header of is prepended to the message by ...


7

"The cloud" is marketing-speak for "other people's servers", so I will use that term instead. When you move critical systems to other people's servers, you need to be aware that they have physical access to the server and to their network connections. When they are not trustworthy, they are able to steal your data or eavesdrop on your network traffic. A ...


7

Privacy and confidentiality are different things... A Zip file, even encrypted, is still there, and onlookers may observe not only the archive presence, name and size, but also the individual names and sizes of files within the archive, because these are not encrypted. Traditional Zip encryption is weak and can be broken within a few minutes, regardless of ...


6

What about hosting those files on other hosting services which have client side encryption like: Tarsnap, which has open source client and does client side encryption. Tahoe-LAFS SparkleShare, which has GUI clients for all operating systems. more on https://prism-break.org/


6

It is not unusual for cloud providers to have a system in place where they can access their customer's data, because there are all sorts of useful things they can't do without looking at the data. They can't index it, they can't de-duplicate it, they can't compress it, they can't scan it for illegal content, and most important of all, they can't restore it ...


6

Take a look at Ferguson's criticism and the official response at the bottom of page 2 and top of page 3 here: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/XTS/follow-up_XTS_comments-Ball.pdf XTS sector/block mode (used on Truecrypt, Drivecrypt, etc) has a temporal quality that can certainly leak information. Ferguson says an adversary who ...


6

No, absolutely not. A virtual machine lacks the necessary knowledge and control over the underlying storage infrastructure to ensure secure deletion of data. For any number of reasons, writes may be redirected to new blocks and thus leaving the old data intact on physical storage. This is a typical behavior for SSD devices due to wear leveling, for ...


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