New answers tagged

1

With just a PIN and no TPM (or removable key storage such as a USB drive or a smartcard that you need to insert to boot), it's impossible to have any meaningful security against an adversary who can access the encrypted drive. It's only a protection against someone casually walking to your desk, inserting a USB stick and rebooting your computer from the ...


7

While Demento's answer is fine, I'd also present another user case I'm personally using: I have full disk encryption set up — using LUKS on a Linux-based box, and the scheme is implemented as follows: The boot partition is encrypted and requires a password to be entered so the boot manager (GRUB) is able to mount it. The partition contains the kernel image ...


45

If decryption only relies on the keyfile and this keyfile is readily available, there is indeed no significant security benefit in your setup. What you can do though is store the keyfile on a removable device (e.g. a USB stick) and detach it when you are not around. That way decryption is only possible when you are present and the removable device is ...


1

Requests for product recommendations are off-topic on this site. However, taking the narrower question of "is Bitlocker safe", yes it is if you use it correctly. (Same caveat applies to Veracrypt, any other reputable full-volume encryption utility, and for that matter any reputable encryption utility of any sort at all). While it's true that it's closed ...


Top 50 recent answers are included