4

Messenger.com is on the HSTS preload list. This means that it requires a https connection, for all browsers that use the HSTS preload list. In addition, any browser which supports HSTS, but does not use the preload list will fail to load messenger.com over http if they have visited the site previously. The standards mandate that untrusted certificates or ...


3

I think you misunderstood how such an attack works. You would not alter the default DNS server on the router after ARP spoofing. You could carry out an attack as following: Become man-in-the-middle with ARP spoofing (this allows you to capture DNS request packets; also don't forward the captured DNS requests, so you don't have to race against the actual DNS ...


2

While static code analysis can improve security, it is wise to take the context into consideration. Same thing is done with vulnerability analysis reports. In your code as written, there is no sensitive details being sent to the server (localhost in this case). So there is something else throwing the issue, and you may want to detail that. What the analysis ...


1

You should probably read "Against DNSSEC" by Thomas Ptacek and its FAQ.


1

When a victim is accessing http://192.168.21.56/ there's no DNS queries involved, hence no DNS poisoning. DNS gives IP addresses based on hostnames, and that's already an IP address. DNS (cache) poisoning refers to a specific attack where a resolver is tricked to cache fake records. Some resolvers will cache anything they get despite they didn't ask for it. ...


1

So DNS poisoning works only if we open a certain website Not exactly, you could instead poison all hostnames in order to target all websites. Since you tagged Ettercap, it appears you can use wildcards in the etter.dns file to achieve what you want, e.g.: *.com A 192.168.21.56


1

I want to mainly focus on the second part of your question, namely the deployment state of DNSSEC. But before getting into that, I thought it would be interesting to note, that beside the obvious advantage, i.e. mitigating DNS poisoning, there are other less known threats when you don't use DNSSEC. A recent paper from 2019 [1], for example, shows how DNS ...


1

Can someone help enlighten me why whitelisting a large range or even just a range of IP's is bad and what the technical rationale is. Whitelisting 250 IP's is a work so light the firewall will barely notice. Blacklisting or whitelisting is something firewalls do all the time. I have a 256MB VPS with around 50,000 rules (blocking entire countries, and ...


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