Any encryption is vulnerable to brute force attack, for example AES-256 has 2^256 keys, and given enough hardware we can “easily” brute force it. The problem is that there’s not enough silicon on Earth to construct enough processors to do it before the heat death of the universe. The fact that encryption can be bruteforced doesn’t mean that this will happen ...
Didn't veracrypt creators know about this issue?
(Not having brute-force protection)
As Andrew Morozko notes in his answer, they have addressed this – as far as it is possible – by using a secure key-generation function (PBKDF2) and high iteration counts. This severely limits the ability to brute-force (assuming the password is long- and random-enough1)...
The answer/thread you linked to stated (regarding the brute force tool):
Practically, this will bring you absolutely nowhere, unless the .dmg was encrypted with an extremely naive password (like 'admin' or '1234').
Unfortunately, based on your description of the passwords:
I don't know the first 38 characters but I do know what they might be (a-z, A-Z,...
The question that you have to ask yourself is, why do you want to use encryption? In security, all measures are means to counter a specific threat. You did not state your threat, so it will be difficult to know what you are trying to protect yourself against.
You did however mention video games, and asked if it was possible to encrypt the game data with ...
Key store is used for private keys. Those can be used for applications that use cryptography features such as public or private key encryption.
These types of keys are supported:
Diffie-Hellman public and private keys
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA, FIPS 186-2) public and private keys
Elliptic Curve Cryptography public and private keys
RSA (PKCS #1) ...
This is correct and to some extent applyes even if the container is not leaked yet. If there is any way the attacker may be able to get to the old version of the container (or just its header) for example if you have backups or ssd with wear leveling, it is better to reencrypt.
"someone like you" refers only to "crypto novice".
Signal protocol says nothing about identity management.
Your server should have a "users" table and for each user a list of public keys.
A user should be able to perform the following operations:
Create a new user identity using a new (not seen before) user identifier, and add a new public key to that ...
Yes, it is safe. AAD (Additional Authenticated Data) is optional. It's available for you to use when you have data you want authenticated (integrity checked) but do no wish to encrypt. In general, in fact, it's far more common to use AEAD algorithms with only encrypted data and no AAD.