41

The biggest obstacle to your proposal is user adoption and behavior change. Imagine having to explain to everyone what a public key is and how great it is to have. This is just not going to happen. Instead, email security has moved to the mail server side of things, with multiple goals: transport encryption. This is already fairly widely deployed sender ...


20

It may seem simple, but it's not. It's actually very complicated. There are a couple moving parts that are difficult to fix: user education: don't count on people knowing what a keypair is, how to create one, how to protect their keys. forgotten/lost keys: if a TLS Certificate is lost, the owner just requests another one. No traffic is lost. But if a user ...


13

It's been touched on in other answers and comments, but I think the fundamental difference between web and e-mail traffic is who the parties involved are. HTTPS actually does two things: It encrypts the communication so that it can't be read by an attacker. This is achieved using a stateful session negotiated directly between the user's browser and the web ...


8

The topic is very complex and is difficult to explain in a single answer. I understand that you disclosed your lack of CS education, so here we are to explain. Transport vs end to end There is a huge difference between transport encryption and end-to-end encryption. You should not confuse them. Https is born as transport encryption (transport security ...


3

There is an important difference between the two. In Decision Theory, there is the idea of Utility, i.e. the value that someone assigns to the various options in a decision. For an infrastructure network such as a road network, railway, the Internet, or Email, the value for an individual is in the number of potential connections / other individuals that are ...


2

Since I can't comment. I tried the code snippet you gave us, by adding this method: public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { String[] plain = new String[] { "{\"a\": \"b\"}", "{\"a\": \"n\"}", "{\"a\": \"k\"}", "{\"a\": \"pzfovvs\"}", "{\"a\": \"bqwuvck\"}" }; for (...


2

It's key distribution. I won't go into all the gory deets, but when you connect to an HTTPS site, a few things happen. Your computer exchanges keys with the site and, importantly, validates that the site (e.g. your bank) is indeed your bank. If it didn't do this, something could pretend to be your bank, decode your traffic, read your passwords and send the ...


2

How does SSH avoid this? There's two key pairs at stake here. Host and Authentication keys. If an attacker captures a private host key, they would be able to impersonate that server from the perspective of connecting clients. At this point you're left with one of two options: a) Either create custom software to connect to the real server and monitor and ...


2

The attack would not succeed, because the Man In The Middle (MITM) needs to have not only the public key of the server, but also the private key as well, in order for the client to be able to complete the handshake with the MITM's server. This question (and answer) are very similar to: Could a stolen certificate show as trusted? Edit 6/4/2020: Once the ...


1

Have a look at this, it's actually quite descriptive: https://mega.nz/SecurityWhitepaper.pdf Also mind you the link you mentioned is over 7 years old, things will have changed since then. How do they verify that the user enters the email / password correctly? While login information is sent to the server only email address. When you create your account, ...


1

That’s a pretty broad set of questions. 1 Can a case be made for added asymmetric + symmetric encryption of data in transit over TLS v1.3? According to what you wrote, at the very least either end-to-end encryption or hybrid encryption is required for data in transit. But even if you plan on using end-to-end encryption, it’d be questioned if you didn’...


1

For high security keys, some systems will export a key by outputting a specified number of “key shards”, which is an m of n set of secret values that are given to five (or however many n is) parties to independently store. When it comes time to recover the value, at least three (or however many m is) people must get together with their shards to decrypt it. ...


1

Surprised that nobody mentioned TPM as an additional measure. Doesn't protect against "god knows what" attacks, but does provide quite a bit more assurance than a keyfile, particularly against boot process attacks (if done right with sealed PCRs), giving you a bit of extra boot device security. PIN on TPM should simplify your passphrase hassle, or a FIDO ...


1

The CCPA statute doesn't provide a technical definition of "delete". This means that until a court case interprets the law otherwise, you can take whatever actions you deem technically sufficient to render the data "deleted". What would be important is that, if you were challenged in court for not deleting a client's data, you could convince a judge that ...


1

TLS Channel binding is targetting to prevent MitM exposure of the both Secret (password) and Data. SASL-SCRAM itself works in a way that it allows authentication without passing the password - password is used as shared secret to perform cryptographic operations on shared non-secret (nonce). That prevents MitM exposure of credentials however it does not ...


1

My understanding is that simply encrypting the data, even using a symmetric shared key, with something like AES or 3DES should be sufficient to verify the data has not been tampered with in transit. If it had been, the message simply would not decrypt. Your understanding is wrong. Why would a message not decrypt if someone flipped a bit? Even this ...


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