New answers tagged

1

It's entirely possible to design your OS such that "legitimate users" can't get to any particular file, but always consider your threat model: If you don't want someone accessing your data, you need to think about all the ways someone might try to access it, not just what "legitimate users" might do. And there's no shortage of nice side-...


1

You can't have a decryption (or encryption) key anywhere that a program can use it but the user whose permissions the program runs with cannot. This is the same problem DRM schemes have. There's no trust boundary between the user and their software; the software can't do anything that the user couldn't write software to do. There are ways to hide the key (...


1

While the length of a message alone is not suitable to directly extract the secrets it might be a valuable context information. If the length of the plain message alone provides useful information then the length of the encrypted message will usually not fully hide these information (only a bit due to padding). Such context is especially useful if there is ...


4

Encrypting a hashed password is not better than adding pepper, despite what you read in your cited answer. It is functionally equivalent, but more computationally intensive (wasteful) and it increases the chances to introduce bugs. You do not need a special library to add pepper. Since you have a library that handles salt, you just have to replace the code ...


1

I'd rather have a password manager with 2 factor auth. You're quite right, in that it's a target, and it's got to be one of your #1s in any kind of DR scenario. I think the advantages of one source of truth, secure password sharing, true random password generation, and granulated access control are worth the hassle of having another system to make highly ...


0

I am trying to prevent user information leak or rainbow table attack To prevent usage of rainbow tables, it is sufficient to use random long salt, e.g. 128 bit salt. One of the links you mentioned, Asymmetric Cryptography as Hashing Function explains well disadvantages of using asymmetric cryptography for password hashing. In particular, password ...


2

... hash value(as ECC private key) -> generate public key from private key You are assuming that an arbitrary key (output of a hash) can be used as an ECC private key and that the public key can be derived from this. This is not how it works though. If you want to derive a key pair from an existing random string or passphrase you would need to use some ...


0

KEK and DEK will not be helpful to you. In these schemes, the key that encrypts the data (DEK: data encryption key) never changes. Only the envelope/wrapper key (KEK: key encryption key) that protects the DEK changes. The KEK is the one that is protected by the user password. You can replace the user password & KEK and then protect the original DEK with ...


0

so all the member in the same network(in the same network means using the same PMK)can calculate the PTK, even PTK is not transmitted in the air. Yes they can. Anyone who knows the Pre-Shared Key/PMK/password can calculate the PTK. But this isn't the threat model WPA is designed to defend against. WPA is meant to prevent an unauthorized person from ...


0

Security for WPA PSK effectively revolves around the secrecy of the key. Anybody who has the key is allowed to connect to the network, and can also decrypt the traffic in the correct circumstances. As long as the key is strong and not shared with the entire world, it is considered reasonably secure for many use cases. Even if you couldn't decrypt the ...


1

The main approach of the Zero knowledge is to derive a standard key from a password (using dedicated algo like PBKDF2). With this approach, you can consider the following : The system does not need to keep an encrypted version of the key, as the key is regenerated, when needed, from the user password. The user does not need to have the key on a USB stick. ...


1

Under normal circumstances, changing the user password from an administrator account will result in the user's EFS encrypted files being lost. If the original password can be set back and the user's key is not changed, then the files can be decrypted again. This is true whether the user is an AD user or a local user, and the password is changed by using an ...


1

You can take a hash (with for example SHA256) or a signature of the data you sumbit. This will be an electronic proof of (un)tampering. You can mandate a notary to keep a copy of the data and its hash or signature, to have a dated proof. Even if you sumbit your data on a write-once medium, like a CD-R for example, nothing technically prevents the recipient ...


1

Roughly speaking, when you do anything on the Internet, you do so through a network interface. That is the thing that "has an IP address". You can have several interfaces on your system (for example Ethernet, WiFi, and the "loopback" interface that allows two programs to talk to each other through the "internet" even if you are ...


1

I'm looking for an unusual solution that uses SFTP server for data transfer but said SFTP server also should act an encryption proxy i.e. all the data it stores on the server side should be encrypted. Although I could use host (OS-wide) encryption it is not gonna be effective during runtime if the hoster I use decided to peek at it or will be forced by 3rd ...


2

TLDR; So, technically from this set of output, we can observe that : " cryptsetup() is using LUKS2 and LUKS2 is using Argon2i as a Key Derivation Function. Now, this Argon2i implementation might be using HMAC as PRF and that HMAC is using SHA256 as an underlying hashing function." MORE ON IT - A Key Derivation Function (eg. PBKDF2, ARGON2, etc.) ...


0

Eight years later . . . you can try using CNG DPAPI, which was meant to work in cloud environments that may or may not be load-balanced. From that link (in case it gets taken down): Microsoft introduced the data protection application programming interface (DPAPI) in Windows 2000. The API consists of two functions, CryptProtectData and CryptUnprotectData. ...


1

As the software update is already encrypted and its origin can be verified, I am asking myself whether the sending entity needs to authenticate themselves. Are there any security issues, when sending secured software over an insecure channel? This is largely how Linux distributions such as OpenSUSE, Debian, Ubuntu and others distribute their software. ...


1

The PCI DSS concerns itself with the following pieces of data: Except insofar as it might include Customer Name, billing address is not PCI protected data, and there are no PCI requirements around storage, encryption, or lack thereof. Instead, that data is PII, and should be protected in line with whatever PII standards apply to your locality.


0

What you are proposing is not designed to solve the problem. What you have described is similar to what SSL/TLS, S/MIME do. It provides data privacy, but not client authentication. For certificate-based authentication, you have to ask approved API consumers to generate CSR and sign them by your private and approved CA. Then configure web server to require ...


1

Short answers: Adding or revoking signing or encryption subkeys does not affect signatures on your public key. Revoking a subkey or letting it expire will have the same effect of marking that subkey invalid for all users. Longer answers: Technically, your entire PGP key consists of subkeys, but the certification ("C") subkey is considered the ...


1

The idea behind encryption is that the original can be restored by decrypting again, that means that the process is lossless and thus the quality of the "file" is not harmed.


5

In order to prevent reverse-engineering of their Management Engine, Intel used: An obscure CPU architecture (not their own) an exotic compression algorithm with hardware-backed dictionary a less-known OS framework Ultimately, they failed (well, almost). But they kept secret the internals of the ME for ~10 years.


0

To know whether each individual app is secure in that scenario cannot be answered without thoroughly auditing each app. But assuming they are securely using TLS for all communications, any type of local biometric authentication probably doesn't have anything to do with what traffic is sent to the server. The application is probably already logged in to the ...


2

The email is encrypted for both, the recipient as well as the sender. So the same email can be read by either the recipient or the sender. In more detail, S/MIME (just like PGP) encrypts the email with a symmetric cipher using a random key, then that key gets encrypted using a asymmetric cipher using the public key of all recipients as well as the sender. ...


27

@Marcus is completely correct about using encryption, and how the key has to be stored somewhere safe and possibly used in conjunction with secure boot. As far as tools go, there are many symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes that may be suitable for your use case. However, you can't protect 100% from someone obtaining your firmware. You can only ...


0

It boils down to Moxie Marlinspike's Cryptographic Doom Principle, which states: If you have to perform any cryptographic operation before verifying the MAC on a message you’ve received, it will somehow inevitably lead to doom. With the AES-CBC as implemented in TLS 1.2, an HMAC of the plaintext (and header information) is taken. Then, this HMAC is ...


18

What you want is impossible; there's no "tool" that can do that. When you encrypt your file, and then only someone in ownership of the key can get the contents – that's the point of encryption. Since you still want to use it, you, however, need to supply that key to the device that will use your image. Can't include the key anywhere unencryptedly ...


0

Encrypting the original content from the creator is a packager's main job, yes. There's a few more things it typically does: Add a "DRM header" to the content itself. This is usually an unencrypted blob (can be text or binary) that provides DRM-related metadata about the content. For example, the URL where the DRM client will need to go to in ...


8

The only useful thing about your routine is cleaning the cookies. It's not useful in itself, it is just that, this way, you delete your login session and so a new login (which requires inputting a secret like a password) is required to interact with the shopping site. A better alternative (in terms of your user experience and security) would be logging out ...


23

So if I wish to open "any" site on a new tab while doing my online shopping, is it safe The same origin policy should prevent other sites from accessing your data in the online shopping site. That is assuming that the shopping site has no vulnerabilities that leak data (CSRF, XSS, XSSI, broken CORS, broken messaging, etc.). Having only one tab ...


2

I do this to ensure any other websites that I open on new tab does not sneak into my credit card information. Is this even possible or just a myth? That is simply not possible, because the browser doesn't allow such a request due to the same origin policy without the website explicitly stating it in their CORS headers; apart from that, credit card info isn'...


0

With GPG the file is actually first encrypted using symmetric encryption, and the key used for that is then encrypted to every recipient using their public keys. Therefore, instead of transferring a single private key between the systems, it's possible to just encrypt the file with multiple recipients. gpg --encrypt --recipient <comp1> --recipient <...


3

Is there any way of preventing the adversaries from accessing the (encrypted) data at all, even after releasing the data? For almost every single case, there's no way. The "after releasing the data" statement means your data (or a copy of it) left your hands and went to someone else. But there's one way (not that I would recommend to this scenario)...


-1

The only way to be certain that your data is safe is to manage the storage, network, and transport of the data yourself. Some questions to ask: Does this data need to go offsite? Can it be stored locally? Does the provider have any known breaches? Who uses the provider? IE is BIGCORP a customer? Could you store this data on an encrypted drive at a friend's ...


3

Here is what you asked: "I want to hand the encrypted data to this party to store and process, but I don't want them to see the encrypted data." That's not possible or realistic. If you don't want them to have access to the data, then don't give them access. Don't give it to them. You could try multiple levels of different encryption, but that's ...


1

Indeed, a certificate contains a public key plus information about who this public key belongs to. It is impossible to sign with a certificate. But there is a moderately common imprecision which consists of using “certificate” to mean “private key for which a certificate exists”. This is what's going on here. The private key is mathematically related to the ...


2

I feel your confusion. From your provided link, I copied the first paragraph: The Web Services Enhancements for Microsoft .NET (WSE) allows a sender, which can either be an XML Web service or its client, to encrypt portions of the SOAP message by using the public key for the recipient's X.509 certificate. A receiver, which can be either a Web service or its ...


0

This could depend on per author / group behind the malware, With the widespread adoption of Lets Encrypt and the lower barrier of entries for things such as SSL certs I would speculate that it will become more common. It could potentially mitigate some IPS / IDS systems from viewing the traffic that is being sent


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