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3

Not very well. In theory, the system should work. In practice, it doesn't. The implementations intended to manage revocation - namely CRL and OCSP - both have problems. Most of this answer is based on this article by Alexey Samoshkin, as well as this article by Scott Helme. What about CRLs? A certificate revocation list is a remarkably simple way of ...


2

For the specific scenario you outline (theft of your computer or hard disk), that will probably work. Note that EFS is based on your Windows password, and Windows' password hashing is incredibly weak by modern standards, so your password will need to be extremely good to prevent a dedicated attacker from brute-forcing the hash. Additionally, EFS provides ...


2

Mitigating Effects of Malicious/Compromised Certificate Authorities There aren't very many things you can do yourself as the client, but I will outline several solutions available anyway. Remove Untrusted Certificates If there are CAs that are trusted by your browser and/or operating system that you do not personally trust, you should remove them. This is ...


5

The phishing and malware protection in Firefox is provided with Google Safe Browsing service. This is not a list you can download. It is instead a database with an SDK on top of it which provides an offline way to determine if a specific URL might be dangerous and which requires in the positive case an additional online verification to eliminate false ...


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