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The fundamental issue that makes the internet architects uncomfortable with NAT is that it appears to conflict with the end to end principle. This basically says that intermediate layer 3 routers should ignore layer 4 connection state so that packets can be routed efficiently down alternative routes. However, NAT is easy to implement in the context of a ...


IPv6 does away with the need for destination NAT for incoming connections, instead delivering them to hosts on the local link with the (public) destination address intact. Outward facing routers advertise externally available prefixes to all internal hosts, and then hosts are free to add addresses with these prefixes on to their interfaces on the local link ...


For inspiration, look at how SSH key exchange works: The client maintains a table of "known servers" that matches an IP address to a hash. When connecting to a server, the client receives the server certificate (public key) and computes the hash of it, and looks up the server's IP address in the "known servers" table. If the client has seen this server ...


When the attacker sends the server's certificate, the client will encrypt a shared secret (used to generate the symmetric encryption key for the session) with the public key of that certificate. The attacker will then be unable to recover the secret since they don't have the certificate's private key, so they won't be able to complete the TLS handshake.


However, in this scheme, couldn't an impostor just present the certificate after getting it from the real server? An impostor cannot present, and take advantage of, the real server's certificate unless it also has the matching private key. This is true whether the SAN DNS entry or IP entry are used to identify the certificate being presented.

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