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It strikes me that whatever method is used, if an attacker gains access to your codebase, they can simple write a script that would decrypt and export the database. Preventive controls - like securing the encryption key with an HSM - attempt to prevent that from happening. But as you say, if someone is deep enough into your application, they can ...


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When your software is user-facing, then a common technique is to give a password to the user they need to enter when launching the application. You use that password to derive the encryption keys for any other secrets. The password itself is stored nowhere except the head of the user. That means an attacker will need user interaction to obtain the encrypted ...


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tl/dr: If money is involved then you need a way to verify your webhook transactions. Your security keys, however, are probably fine, although in the end that is a business decision for you to make. Private webhook endpoint Your concerns over a private webhook endpoint are quite valid. In fact, this is one of the biggest dangerous for webhook ...


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There's nothing wrong with this model, so far as your question goes. Lots of systems store an encrypted key alongside the ciphertext (examples include most disk encryption tools and many file or email encryption tools, such as PGP). Whether it's a good idea to do things this way depends on what you're trying to achieve. If you need to make it possible to ...


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First of all: stop developing until you can really understand encryption, privacy, and the laws regarding medical data. If because of financial reasons you cannot have an expert to inspect and certify your solution, for financial reasons you should not develop it. The money spent on having a specialist helping you design and test is a few orders of magnitude ...


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Since asking the question, I have acquired a better understanding of the matter, which allows me to answer my question myself. Smartcards, when working as designed, prevent an adversary from reading out the secret keys that are stored on them, but not from using them. Say that an adversary has gained access to the card, for example by breaking into the ...


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You could try to mimic Certificate Revocation Lists. That means that each member of the network could publish its public key on a site they manage. But as you have no global authority, I cannot imagine a way to certify the current public key. Said differently, if an attacker manages to hack the site displaying the public key, they could impersonate the user ...


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