10

The PGP keyserver pool has dozens (129 at the moment) of keyservers in it. When you make a request to it, you may get a different server than the previous request. Over time, the keyservers all exchange their new keys & signatures with one another, so it will eventually propagate to all of them. It's hard to say what "eventually" is, but my experience ...


7

Need for HTTPS for PGP keys? For PGP, we already have a PKI mechanism build in, called the web of trust, so we don't necessarily need HTTPS keyserver. Even if the key servers did serve their keys over HTTPS, you couldn't be sure of the correctness of the keys, as anyone can submit arbitrary keys to the server. Serving the untrusted keys over HTTPS wouldn't ...


5

This can be accomplished in many ways. The most simple access control to a HSM is a physical button. So if a malware compromises the host computer, somebody still needs to be physically present to push the button for the HSM to do anything. Then you have a whole range of different access protection, ranging from verifying the software in the host server "...


4

A PGP keyfile is not a single key string, but contains several entries (packets). Instead of trying to compare the ASCII representation of both files, you should use appropriate tools such as gpg(1) and compare the fingerprints. Is there some way to make this easy? Yes, like this: $ wget https://www.idrix.fr/VeraCrypt/VeraCrypt_PGP_public_key.asc $ gpg -...


4

Yeah, don't. That is to say, don't assume you will be storing 1m+ keys on an HSM, regardless of who made it. HSMs are not hard drives. Don't use them like one. Some HSMs support external keys. These are keys which are encrypted/wrapped using a specific AES-256 (for example) key, derived from some other key. This 'master' key derivation key remains in ...


3

If the key owner provided his or her actual email adress when generating the keys you can read it from the public key. For an asc keyfile you could simply use gpg [file] It should also be displayed when importing the key into Gpg4Win. Source


3

There are a few things to take into account here. Why is this not required by keyservers to ensure that only the owner of the private key can upload … ? The main problem with a malicious key is someone posing as an identity he is not allowed to use. The uploader of the key would hold the private key, so we didn't gain anything here. On the other hand, ...


3

The SKS key server pool is not a single key server, but a whole pool of servers administrated by different users all of the world. By using DNS round robin, you will be assigned to a different one from time to time (actually, you will get a new set of servers every 60 seconds). It can happen that a single server is having issues, and there is some delay ...


3

Fingerprints and key IDs are related: short and long key IDs just form the lower 8 respective 16 hex digits (32 respective 64 bites) of the fingerprint. An example using my own fingerprint: fingerprint: 0D69 E11F 12BD BA07 7B37 26AB 4E1F 799A A4FF 2279 long id: 4E1F 799A A4FF 2279 short id: ...


2

tl;dr: both dumps contain the same keys, but you get some additional certifications from the key server not included in the minimal export of the VeraCrypt website. OpenPGP Packets OpenPGP keys are composed by a set of OpenPGP packets, which can be listed by gpg --list-packets and pgpdump. For exported keys, there's one required packet, the public key ...


2

Anybody can upload anything to the key server network, and there is only minimal verification of syntactical correctness. Do never trust anything on the key servers without further verification! Whenever you fetch a key from the key server network, you should verify it for validity, for example through comparing the key's fingerprint with the key's ...


2

Do the keys need to be in the HSM? Scenarios like this often are solved by not having a million separate secrets in HSM, but by having a million encrypted secrets and having a HSM decrypt them if needed. In your mind, what's the conceptual difference between secure storage and use of a million keys versus a million passwords (assuming that they need to be ...


1

You can simply follow the alternative instructions just below that block: Alternatively you can use instead the WKD to download the key: wget -O- https://gentoo.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/wtktzo4gyuhzu8a4z5fdj3fgmr1u6tob?l=releng | gpg --import Although, if you have a new enough gpg client, you can simply perform gpg --verbose --locate-key releng@...


1

They publish their CA certificate on their website. Verify that you are accessing it securely (HTTPS with no errors), then download it. You can also verify its signature and fingerprint (all listed). They also have instructions to tell gpg to use a local CA to verify the connection: hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net This is a pool containing only servers ...


1

GPG and SSH are actually designed for different scenarios. GPG is typically used to identify the user so it would make sense for each user to only have one GPG keypair. However, SSH is typically designed to identify the client device - in other words you want each computer to have its its own SSH keypair. Personally I use Lastpass to manage my GPG key, but ...


1

I can see some slight differences. Encryption engine is just processor (mathematical engine) which takes the data and encrypts/decrypts/hashes them using some keys and given algorithms. Key server can be a separate server so called Key Vault where encryption keys or other secrets can be stored. Key manager, form my point of view, is component of key ...


1

There are purpose built HSMs in the market for this very requirement. With these HSMs you only store your KEKs (key encryption key) in the HSMs, the actual key / customer data is encrypted by the KEK and stored in a relational database - outside of the HSMs. Whenever the data needs to be decrypted, the request to the HSM is sent along with the data (from the ...


1

HSMs are available that are built for this usage, look up "clustered HSM". Another option is to have a regular security database that is protected by the HSM (either a card in a slot, or available on the network). You could then use one or more HSMs to protect your high availability certificate storage servers. Of course depending on your actual ...


1

I cannot encourage your idea of an online backup of the decryption key. As soon as the decryption key leaves the devices controlled by the data owners (the users) the whole effort of client-side-encryption becomes worthless. A secure place for a decryption key can only be defined by the data owners since only they know the value of the encrypted data. You ...


1

Problem with A - Anyone with access to the server can decrypt the message because a copy of all symmetric keys is stored on the server. Plaintext of message may be stored in server RAM temporarily when re-encrypting message Problem with B - Why not immediately Bpk(Message)? Why use an additional session key Ka-b(message), Bpk(Ka-b). For both methods, B is ...


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