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6

With either rotary or touch tone dialing, if you can hear it then you know what was entered. The ticks/tones are designed to be unambiguous to the recipient. So, any listener can recover the digits easily. Modern attackers will capture and analyze the audio, and the tones were designed to be distinctive to equipment from the 1970s/80s. Some old school ...


5

The first point to observe is that if you click one of the above addresses you shouldn't be able to open it. They all point (clearly in the case of Azure) to a link-local IP address. These are reserved addresses in the space 169.254.0.0/16 that are not forwarded by routers, and crucially are only accessible from a given instance. The second point to note ...


4

While mutual TLS and certificate pinning are intended for different problems they can be used to solve the specific problem of detecting active MITM too. Only, with mutual TLS it is the server which detects the MITM (client certificate not as expected) while with certificate pinning it is the client (server certificate not as expected). Implementation ...


3

Delivery from the MUA is usually done to the domain specific mail provider (MSA in your image). This communication is typically done either inside a companies protected network or to some external mail provider. Mail delivery inside the local network is usually protected against DNS spoofing as long as it can be assumed that there is no attacker inside the ...


3

In short, the Finished message is a hash of the entire handshake, encrypted with the negotiated keys. The negotiated keys are derived by something protected by asymmetric cryptography. Validation of the Finished message validates the transcript of the handshake. This is probably answered in multiple answers on SE for "How does TLS work?".


2

With an attacker on the same broadcast domain (in this case subnet) it is relatively easy to perform an ARP spoofing attack. Within a broadcast domain TCP sequence prediction style attacks become much more valid if the attacker can simply listen for the sequence number in promiscuous mode instead of actually guessing it.


2

Short answer: It depends on how your client application communicates to the backend server. Long answer The answer to this question depend on how the application communicates. If it is using HTTP for communication and if it relies on the system proxy settings, yes you can: by setting the system proxy to the burp proxy listener. If it is using HTTP for ...


1

First, a brief on how TLS works and why it is used- TLS is used to provide encryption to the data stream and form a secure channel between the user and the server. A TLS Handshake is used to authenticate the server and generate the session keys to be used in the encryption process. ​TLS uses a combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography and hence, ​...


1

Using a hash to check HTML content will only work in a limited set of circumstances. Any of the following will change the content read in the browser and therefore change the hash: interference by the web server (e.g. Apache/Nginx); web accelerator (e.g. Cloudflare); and browser (e.g. removal of meta http-equiv CSP nonce so that it can't be sniffed).


1

...to protect against tempering by my web host... If you do not trust your hosting provider, all bets are off. They have full control over your website, and no clever tricks are going to change that. ...or other MITM attacks that SSL was not able to prevent. TLS is not perfect, but it's good. You should focus your effort on using it properly (e.g. ...


1

Can it do the same for a client application? As always, this depends. If the client application uses HTTP(S) to communicate to the server, then Burp can be used. If the client does not communicate using HTTP(S), Burp is not your application. However, you could use common tools to sniff the network such as tcpdump or wireshark to intercept the traffic. ...


1

Yes If the server doesn't present a certificate (or it is not validate), the client will happily give {Token, Request} to the presumed server. A MITM could act as the server, receive the tokens and requests and pass them to the real server. They do not need to be signed by a public CA, though. You could be using your own PKI (a private CA to sign those ...


1

I can't read, apparently. The justification is described in the RFC itself: A number of pre-conditions need to hold for this attack to work: [...] 4. Either one of the following condition is met: 4a. The attacker (via the installed application) is able to observe only the responses from the authorization endpoint. When "...


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