257
The output of MD5 is binary: a sequence of 128 bits, commonly encoded as 16 bytes (technically, 16 octets, but let's use the common convention of bytes being octets).
Humans don't read bits or bytes. They read characters. There are numerous code pages which tell how to encode characters as bytes, and, similarly, to decode bytes into characters. For almost ...
202
This approach is fundamentally flawed. Anything on the client side can and will be tampered with by players. It is the same problem which makes DRM untenable - the user owns the machine and all the data on it, including your executables, data in memory, etc. Keeping algorithms secret doesn't work (see Kerckhoffs's principle) because it only takes a small ...
105
MD5 for passwords
Using salted md5 for passwords is a bad idea. Not because of MD5's cryptographic weaknesses, but because it's fast. This means that an attacker can try billions of candidate passwords per second on a single GPU.
What you should use are deliberately slow hash constructions, such as scrypt, bcrypt and PBKDF2. Simple salted SHA-2 is not good ...
93
The size of the input is irrelevant. In fact, because of the birthday paradox, you don't need any more than the size of the hash to make collisions guaranteed. The best way to avoid collisions is to use a stronger hash which is not vulnerable to them, such as SHA-2. However, you are describing a more difficult attack than a collision attack, called a ...
90
Producing SHA-1 collisions is not that easy. It seems reasonable that the attack with has been described on SHA-1 really works with an average cost of 261, much faster than the generic birthday attack (which is in 280), but still quite difficult (doable, but expensive).
That being said, we do not really know what makes hash functions resistant (see for ...
74
To complement the good answer from @D.W.: for password hashing, MD5 is no more broken than any other hash function (but don't use it nonetheless).
The full picture: MD5 is a cryptographic hash function which, as such, is expected to fulfill three characteristics:
Resistance to preimages: given x, it is infeasible to find m such that MD5(m) = x.
Resistance ...
67
Yes, they were likely able to crack many of the passwords in a short time.
From the official Yahoo statement:
For potentially affected accounts, the stolen user account information may have included names, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords (using MD5) and, in some cases, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and ...
60
My question is: Does every hash value H have a value V?
For example, given md5 hash value f2c057ed1807c5e4227737e32cdb8669 (totally random), can we find what it was from?
These are actually two very different questions: whether there is an input for each output, and whether we can find an input for each output.
For your first question: we do not know. ...
59
Try sending a HEAD request.
I'm assuming that with ascii.txt included, the output of the script is just over a nice number like 4096 bytes, a common output_buffering value. Once the script has written output_buffering bytes, it needs to flush the output buffer before continuing.
Normally this works fine and the script continues, but if the request type is ...
45
The password format in the userpassword attribute looks like the standard format used by various unix services, such as the default system password service which stores hashed passwords in /etc/shadow. The format is basically:
$ type $ salt $ hash
In your example, the type is 1, which designates an md5 hash. There are other well-known types, such as ...
42
Hashing is not encryption (it is hashing), so we do not "decrypt" MD5 hashes, since they were not "encrypted" in the first place.
Hashing is one-way, but deterministic: hash twice the same value, and you get twice the same output. So cracking a MD5 hash is about trying potential inputs (passwords) until a match is found. It works well when the input is "a ...
40
There are three problems here:
What you're trying to do is fundamentally misguided in several ways, as described in Polynomial's answer.
If you insist on doing it anyway, then you're not even using the right primitive! Authenticating messages requires a MAC, not a hash. It's possible to build a MAC out of a hash -- this is what HMAC does -- but it's not as ...
40
The attacker is trying to exploit Joomla component called com_s5clanroster which is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
An SQL injection vulnerability has been reported in Joomla Com
S5clanroster. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would
allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the
affected system.
https://www.checkpoint.com/...
35
To complete @CodesInChaos' answer, MD5 is often used because of Tradition, not because of performance. People who deal with databases are not the same people as those who deal with security. They often see no problem in using weak algorithms (e.g. see the joke of an algorithm that MySQL was using for hashing passwords). They use MD5 because they used to use ...
34
No. It's not just the length of the output. There are significant differences in their level of security against cryptanalytic attacks.
There are devastating collision attacks on MD5. (The Wikipedia article on MD5 has some details.) These attacks mean that MD5 provides essentially no security against collisions: it is easy to find collisions in MD5.
In ...
34
SHA-1 and MD5 are broken in the sense that they are vulnerable to collision attacks. That is, it has become (or, for SHA-1, will soon become) realistic to find two strings that have the same hash.
As explained here, collision attacks do not directly affect passwords or file integrity because those fall under the preimage and second preimage case, ...
31
Most remaining usages of MD5 are due to developers who just don't know better. If you are a frequent reader of this site, then you will soon learn that the "default" hash function to use is SHA-256; that's what cryptographers and standardization bodies recommend. But you will also notice an apparently endless stream of people who want to use MD5, or suggest ...
31
There are lots of known cryptographic weaknesses in MD5 which make it unusable as a message digest algorithm, but not all of these also apply in the context of password hashing. But even when we assume that these do not exist, MD5 is still a bad password hashing algorithm for one simple reason: It's too fast.
In any scenario where an attacker obtained the ...
30
This password hash seems to use the crypt() format (which, despite its name and what some documentations say, including that very man page, has absolutely nothing to do with encryption; it is hashing). When it starts with $1$, this means that it is a password hashing function based on MD5. Its exact specification is "whatever glibc does". A look at the ...
28
What do you mean "prohibited"? Who would "prohibit" use of MD5? It's not like we have some International Crypto Cops who go arrest people who use ROT13 and other insecure crypto schemes.
Or, to be a bit more serious: cryptographers already recommend that new systems should avoid MD5, and they recommend that existing systems should migrate away from MD5. ...
28
'face2face' is only 9 characters, i.e. 36 bits since we are using hexadecimal encoding. It suffices to generate many pictures with some internal variations (subtle variations that do not impact the graphical output) and hash them all until the target string is obtained. Since we are looking for a 36-bit pattern and accept that pattern wherever it appears in ...
27
The security flaw isn't in MD5 in this case. And the idea isn't to get if (!isset($_POST['pass']) || md5($_POST['pass'])!='castle') to evaluate in favor of the hacker. The vulnerability appears when you crash the script. The admin privileges are not conditional. No matter what the user gets their permission elevated by setting 1 to $_SESSION['admin_level']. ...
27
Edit: To clarify, I can't speak to the security of your approach, only the hash portion. There are some strong comments here discouraging your approach. (i.e. a good hash can be part of a secure approach or an insecure approach, just like a good lock can be used on either a good door/frame, or a flimsy door/frame)
In response to your TL;DR I can say quite ...
26
The definition of a cryptographic hash function includes resistance to preimages: given h(x), it should be infeasible to recover x. A hash function being "reversible" is the exact opposite of that property. Therefore, you can have no more a "reversible hash function" than you can have a fish allergic to water.
Possibly you might want a hash function which, ...
24
First, there's Kerckhoffs's principle which is always desirable:
A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.
where in this case the password is the key. So its not a goal to keep the cryptosystem secret.
Second, you are wrong about those being md5 or sha512 hashes; the values stored in your /...
24
And it is longer than the input string, with 288bit instead of 256bit. So did we actually increased the entropy?
No, you did not increase the entropy.
In this context, "entropy" basically refers to the probability of any particular guess about the content or value being correct.
If I tell you that I have hashed a single lowercase US English letter's ASCII ...
23
First of all, MD5 is not an encryption algorithm. It is a hash function. Encryption generally implies decryption, which you cannot do with a hash function.
Who said MD5 is good or unbreakable? It is 'breakable'. The complexity of obtaining a collision for MD5 is around 2^64. This is the equivalent of an exhaustive key search of 64 bits, quite weak for ...
22
If using SSL, then what PostgreSQL does is fine. If not using SSL, but still doing the authentication across the network, then what PostgreSQL does stinks. Their games with MD5 are worthless, but not because they use MD5. MD5 has its own issues, but there they are just misusing it awfully.
With "cleartext password" authentication, the client shows a user ...
22
Stop. Go no further. Do no more testing, demonstration, etc. until you have been explicitly asked to do so in writing, and even then beg off and suggest that there are many more qualified people than you to do an audit/pentest/etc.
I know of 2 people who did similar with less information (no passwords, just details that they didn't need access to and ...
21
(Summary is in the last paragraph.)
How long will it take to crack 1 password? Is the time to crack 1 billion, just 1e9 * t?
Imagine I have this hashing algorithm:
function hash(password):
hash = 0
foreach character in password:
hash = hash + toNumber(character)
return hash
If you call hash("ab") it might return 3, since the first ...
Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible
