New answers tagged memory
3
Recently I had been reading the papers published at the NDSSS 2019, and this paper presented in February I think answers the question completely. At the time the question was asked, it seems like the answer to there being vulnerabilities was yes but they have been fixed in the Linux kernel from 5.0. Slides belonging to the paper presented at the Network ...
1
The cloud ultimately is someone else's computer, and someone else's rules. If you are looking for physical access security, the best path may be to host your own physical server, or get a dedicated physical server. With all the tools available to orchestrate this today, and the likely fact that you will be wanting to host projects for a long time, it's not ...
0
Your question seems to switch pace a few times, but if your main concern is someone cloning your work, the following should be simple protection:
Make sure there is nothing interesting to steal
Rather than letting the source code for everything live on their machines, work on the code in a different environment and deploy only the binaries.
This should ...
19
so that it would not be economically viable to spend time & resources to get them.
I hate to break it to you, but you simply aren't that important. No-one knows you or your web app. So it's already not economically viable.
Consider the cost-benefit. For the hosting company, if this happens once, they'd hemorrhage customers. So they're going to have ...
4
Lie Ryan's answer is the right one, but beyond colocation, which still has physical attack surface at the host's premises, one additional possibility is using the hosting provider just to get you a public-facing IP address, and tunneling that to an on-own-premises server via a decent home or business class broadband link.
If you want to get really fancy, ...
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In a virtual machine environment, the debug registers will be dumped to the host's RAM while the VM is not running. This means that, in this environment, TRESOR adds no meaningful security. In fact, it may reduce overall security by placing sensitive encryption keys in a predictable location.
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I don't fully trust for some reason
Trust them in what way? Do you believe they may be incompetent or do you think they may be malicious?
If merely incompetent, you'll probably get reasonable protection from the encryption you've described. It is of course possible that their host machine gets compromised and the attacker finds a way to grab the current ...
4
Microsoft has a possible solution for this called Shielded VMs, these are specifically intended for the attack vector that some malicious actor has administrative access to the hypervisor. An example of this would be machines deployed either in the cloud or in a colo.
The downside is that you will need to maintain a Guardian Server under your physical ...
11
In theory, you should be able to use the trusted hardware features of modern CPUs to run your disk encryption, or even your entire VM, inside a tamper-resistant part of the CPU, having all the data on disk and in memory encrypted with keys that are only accessible inside that tamper-resistant trusted enclave.
While exposing Intel's SGX trusted computing ...
109
You can't, plain and simple. If you don't trust the hosting company, you don't host with them. This is law #3 from 10 immutable law of security:
Law #3: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer, it's not your computer anymore.
The hypervisor always have privileged position over your virtualised machine, you can't protect yourself ...
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