The two options are intended for different use cases.
Option 1 is intended for your use case. It encrypts the file with a key derived from a password, so that only the person who knows the password (i.e. most likely the person who encrypted it in the first place) can decrypt it.
Option 2 is designed so you can share encrypted files/messages with others. The ...
The idea of a large number of iterations is not to be part of the secret, but to take more time.
Having a database with a large number of passwords means someone will have a weak password, and it's trivial to test the dictionary of worst 100k passwords in minutes, no matter if you are using 200k iterations, or 153 as you are using. A dedicated password ...
There's one advantage of using public key cryptography over private key cryptography when you're encrypting file for yourself.
When you use symmetric cryptography, you need to expose the password every time you need to encrypt or decrypt a file.
With public key cryptography, you only need to decrypt the private key if you need to decrypt the file.
In public ...
So what's the point of using a private key instead of a password if the private key itself is password protected? Why wouldn't I want to straightforwardly use option 1?
In this case it's probably not a big point. But certificates can be stored on smart cards. Smart cards refuse to hand out a copy of the certificate, but they can do computations based on the ...
In short, from the mentioned link
we hash passwords to prevent an attacker with read-only access from
escalating to higher power levels
Now to your question, suppose if someone has access to /etc/shadow file and the file contains the password which the user has used at multiple machines/websites or the file contains the ...
Will JtR automatically account for the salt + hash, or will it fail to
ever find the correct password, even if it is present in the
manyword.txt file because of the salt being unaccounted for?
But the salt is accounted for - it's right there in your password string, which breaks down using $ as a delimiter like such:
In addition to the other answers about iteratively checking weak passwords until you get a hit for some account, consider this:
What if you already know one of the passwords in the DB? Perhaps it's yours, or belongs to somebody you know who agrees to help out. Perhaps it's from a breach on some other site, and the user re-used passwords (never do that).
Because hashing is iterative, if the attacker doesn't know the number of rounds, they can compare the current result after each iteration to the target (stopping at some large limit like 216–218).
This approach falls squarely in "security through obscurity" territory, and undermines the purpose of iterating the hash.
Rule 1 is typical for character set interoperability - Unicode characters may be encoded in UTF-8, Latin-1, or any other unspecified encoding.
The minimum value for rule 2 is obviously for providing minimum password strength, whereas the maximum is to ensure server processing speed (OWASP recommends 64 as a maximum, specific applications may have additional ...
No, it can't prevent cookie stealing.
Yubikeys (and other 2FA schemes) can protect you against password leaks and phishing. Some variants, such as U2F will entirely make phishing impossible, while others will narrow the time window and success rate significantly.
When it comes to cookie stealing, they do nothing. After you've authenticated and been given a ...
If you want to get everything in GMail, the feature already exists in Settings/Accounts And Imports.
You can retrieve your mail from your other account there, and set it up so replying to mail from your external provider has the external provider address, and not your Gmail one.
One thing, the recipient will still be able to see that the mail comes from ...
In this case i would consider it a 1-factor authentication, but only from the client-side.
On the client side it would not much differ from using a password only, as each factor is not seperated from each other and can be accessed with the same password.
From a server-side view it can still be considered a 2-factor authentication, as the authentication ...
Let's assume you have the following hash to crack, which is taken from the unshadowing process from a Unix system:
galoget@hackem:~$ cat hash_to_crack.txt
In this case, we only left the username and the hash separated by colons, the rest of the ...
Other two answers seem to express a sort of FUD regarding using HMAC signed token for password resetting.
If the concern, as stated in other answers, is about getting your singing keys stolen from the server, then the attacker already has access to much more than just signing keys, at which point this argument is moot.
Saving token data in the database is ...
secretsdump.py from impacket works. It ships with Kali as impacket-secretsdump. After extracting the SAM and SYSTEM hives from Windows/System32/config, you can use it like this:
impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM -system SYSTEM LOCAL
I just talked to them today and they are still doing the same thing. The lady who helped me was not very knowledgable about encryption, but she did tell me what she did to validate my account. She told me she didn't have access to my account's password. But rather, she typed the characters I sent her into a prompt and then the system either validated it or ...