New answers tagged

0

Just wanted to add another method using fcrackzip CLI tool. It's in most Linux distro repos such as Ubuntu & Fedora/CentOS. Using it is pretty straightforward: $ fcrackzip -b -c a1:$% -l 1-6 -u myencrypted.zip Options -b - brute force -c a1:$% - specifies the character sets to use -l 1-6 - specifies the length of passwords to try -u - unzip to weed ...


0

No, the only thing that they might get access to would be any saved configurations on the devices, But aside from that your new router and all devices behind it are not connected in any way.


1

Probably not the exact solution you're looking for, but using full disk encryption would ensure that swaped files are always stored in an encrypted volume. In the case of Windows as the swap partition is actually a file in the regular filesystem - which is encrypted by FDE - it would be encrypted For *nix systems you should make sure that the swap ...


2

A slightly radical approach, but if you really want to ensure that no (unencrypted) information from those text files ends up on non-volatile memory drives, I recommend you to use a Live CD (such as Knoppix), and only from there, mount the hard disk, copy the encrypted files to a ramdisk (everywhere else will be in-memory), decrypt and edit as needed. The ...


0

You've calculated the MD5 of the file itself, not of its password ('123'). According to its download page, the only hashes supported by Hash Suite are as follows, and ZIP files are not included: LM, NTLM, Raw-MD5, Raw-SHA1, Raw-SHA256, Raw-SHA512, DCC, DCC2, SSHA, MD5CRYPT, BCRYPT, WPA-PSK Compressed file formats are only supported for storing wordlists, ...


10

Any online service that acts on your behalf with other network services will normally need to store the credentials needed for those other services. While there are other ways to implement authenticate between services, such as OAuth2, in practice very few services implement such mechanisms. So when an online application needs to perform on your behalf, it ...


62

Sparks stores your account credentials on their systems. This is also described in their privacy policy: INFORMATION WE COLLECT AND HOW WE USE THIS INFORMATION Auth login or mail server credentials: Spark requires your credentials to log into your mail system in order to receive, search, compose and send email messages and other ...


2

One of the misleading things about password statistics is that the most common passwords may not in fact be that common. The passwords 123456 and password are always among the top passwords, but that doesn't mean that you'll see them in the wild that much. In 2014 I compiled the top passwords list for SplashData and wrote an article about some of the ...


102

Another possibility : Sojdlg123aljg is latin characters translation from another alphabet. For instance, a common password "ji32k7au4a83" is from mandarin "我的密碼", meaning "my password" (source). Using this online keyboard, you can validate that typing successively j-i-3 maps to 我. However it does not works for Soj... So either it is a different language, ...


1

You should at least do whatever the bank requires. For a similar application mine does require either a PIN (on the app-level) or a fingerprint unlock (on the app-level). And that's all what I basically use, besides the phones screen lock.


117

One of the most logical explanations is that those accounts were associated with a bot. Same goes for password like 18atcskd2w. Graham Cluley wrote an article about this: So, Just Why Is 18atcskd2w Such a Popular Password? Can so many people really be choosing to protect their online accounts with the same, seemingly random choice of “18atcskd2w”, “...


6

While the other responses debate the effectiveness of each algorithm from the list, I will attempt answer from the .NET Core perspective. Unless things have changed recently, the only algorithm from your list that is natively supported (ie authored by Microsoft) in .NET Core is PBKDF2. For some companies, this means that this is your only choice. If you have ...


10

Even though Argon2 is my personal favorite among them, all of them are solid choices and you will likely not get weird looks for choosing one over the other. What matters the most is that you properly benchmark your system, so that you choose sane parameters. With Argon2, you additionally have to select a mode-of-operation. There is Argon2i, Argon2d and ...


28

Argon2 is the best of those to use. It has been well-vetted and is the subject of intense research. It was chosen as the winner in the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) to replace scrypt, which has some nasty time-memory tradeoff (TMTO) attacks, and which is not nearly as flexible in configuration. Argon2 won the PHC and is based on a thorough analysis of ...


1

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1

The algorithm you describe is normal fast hash. Such hashing algorithms should only be use to check integrity of files, but not for hashing password. Whirlpool and similar algorithms are designed to be fast and thus make brute force attacks easier. Use key stretching / password derivation. For instance, use PBKDF2, scrypt or Argon2. The are designed to make ...


4

Whirlpool itself is a cryptographically-secure hash function like SHA-512 and has no known weaknesses that would be relevant to hashing secrets. However, using it directly for password hashing is a bad idea because it is fast, allowing an attacker to guess many passwords per second. This is not unique to the Whirlpool hash. A memory-hard KDF like Argon2 ...


3

Use password-hash (https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.password-hash.php) which will continually use the most secure method as PHP continues to release new versions. Asking users to update passwords isn't a huge issue. Whirlpool doesn't have any known cryptographic flaws, but there are certainly better algorithms to use. Source: https://www.novatec-gmbh....


4

In particular, I'm thinking of the attacker either generating a new hash for a known password --or taking the attacker's own hashed password-- and substituting it into another user's record." So, the attacker's own password thing is unlikely. There are technical defences that could stop it, such as deterministic "salt" (instead of hashing just the password, ...


0

You need a threat model in order to assess risk. You don't have one. Yes, an attacker could insert new password hashes into a stolen copy of the database. That is relatively easy to do. In fact, you can assume any attacker who bothers to steal a database is capable of mounting, reading, and modifying that database in its entirety. But what is the harm ...


0

"What is the risk" - only you can answer what is the risk. Nobody else knows your system, nobody else can evaluate what is your risk. "having the application decrypt secrets" - This cannot happen. Well, it can, if you do everything wrong. But nobody uses authentication password for anything else like for encryption of data on the server. Authentication ...


0

A good password scheme is not just about entropy. All the entropy in the world will not protect you if you reuse passwords. All it takes is one site storing your password in the clear. A good scheme also has to discourage password reuse. In this case it depends on how the card is used. If a user thinks "I have a super secure password now" and reuses that ...


1

My novice guess is, that you have a reduced entropy because of only 8 different characters (+ 1 start sequence) Not necessarily. Let's compare a password that uses characters from the English alphabet (upper-) and lowercase. A password of length n has (2 * 26)**n possible values (and realistically much less than that since the target audience probably isn'...


4

Brute Force Options: Credential Spraying (distributed brute force): try the same password on multiple accounts or multiple systems (or variations on this theme). No one account is getting focus, so the attack on each account goes under the radar. Offline Brute Force: use a weakness in the system to extract the password database that contains the (hopefully)...


4

you have a reduced entropy [...], but as long as your card stays unknown, the attacker can't exploit this fact If the card stays unknown, the attacker can't exploit it even if you write your complete password on it. This is, however, a very bad assumption to make, exactly for the same reason why writing passwords down is bad. Installing a password manager ...


5

Looks very impractical to me. Disadvantages (cumbersome calculations, you need not to lose your card, you need to remember your password) outweigh the advantages (strong password). I fail to find a use case for this scheme: For unsavvy users (your grandpa), it is much more practical to write down the password in a notebook kept in a locked drawer. For ...


18

Not 100% clear from your exposition, but I understand the second row is generated independently at random for each card. I'll work from that assumption. I'll further assume that: The attacker is trying to guess your password. The attacker knows you've generated your password using such a card. The attacker doesn't know the random content unique to your ...


0

Nope, that's very much not a good idea. Just using the random salt from your step #1 is likely good enough. Section 4.1 of RFC 2898 provides recommendations for how to generate salts; the additional suggestion they make is that some applications will want to also have associated data pertaining to the encryption/decryption context. The problem with using ...


0

The authentication systems in Windows AD and Linux are completely different. Windows AD uses Kerberos, which uses various "tokens", "tickets" and keys to establish identity. Linux systems can use Kerberos authentication if there is a Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) to support it, but more likely they continue to use their native authentication system ...


-1

This one is a bit tricky. Caution is definitely advised. On today's network logins, cleartext passwords should NOT be transmitted over the wire to the authentication server. (LDAP, Kerberos, etc. should all be using the secure protocol.) The very basics (for understanding purposes only): When a user authenticates to the system, this is what happens … Client: ...


4

Why is using the password as part of the salt a problem? Because you need to store the salt separately from the hash of the password. You can either do this by encoding them in a specific way, such as storing them as $Rfc2898$iterations$mysalt$myhash or by using dedicated database tables. If you would go with the scheme you proposed (crating a random salt, ...


0

I would guess that the reason windows stores this information in reversible format is so that it can be read by the OS later. You can read the WiFi key from settings anyway, which some people find useful to tell their friends what the wireless key is so they can join the network. (windows 10 used to have a feature called "wifi sense" that shared your key in ...


3

Did word store my password I saved in plaintext??? The answer is in your question. "I have a document which I wrote my passwords in and saved it to my disk" is the definition of saving password in plain text. If yes, how do I have a word [document] with it? You do not. That is, if you want to avoid saving passwords in plain text. Instead, you should use ...


64

It always depends on what you compare it with! What is the realistic alternative, that users would actually use, to using this card? Clearly, 4uR=?F133Y9Yi31 is a much better password than HELLOWORLD. If you are giving this card to a non-techie whos not going to pick good passwords or use a password manager anyway, then it's an improvement. On the other ...


85

Full disclosure: I work for a company, which distributes such cards. This answer however is my own personal opinion of them. The idea of these cards is that some users are just really bad at remembering passwords or pass phrases. The naïve approach would be to tell users "Just get better at remembering passwords", but experience has shown that such advice ...


35

The password is never sent. It is hashed, and that hash is used (indirectly) for encryption. Unfortunately, the other answers which claim that the original password is necessary for authentication are incorrect. The password can be passed through an algorithm called PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 with 256-bit output and a salt derived from the ESSID (network name) to ...


120

tl;dr- Windows is acting as a password manager, and like all password managers, it must remember the passwords it manages. You're probably thinking of the thing where servers are supposed to store hashes instead of passwords; that strategy doesn't apply here. @forest's answer demonstrates a major caveat – that, if we assume a wireless network will ...


1

I was looking for a standard, guideline or at least a recognised term for the "sensitive action confirmation". What I found is OWASP Authentication cheat sheet and Require Re-authentication for Sensitive Features section there. In summary the attack surface looks like: CSRF XSS Session hijacking including temporary physical access to a user's browser For ...


0

TL;DR: The safest way to generate a password is by generally using a password manager Someone who cracks hashes or bruteforces login attempts has several tools at hand to find possible passwords (or password hashes respectively) in question. Dictionaries or wordlists are only one of these. So to limit your defensive techniques against dictionaries only is ...


0

3D Secure implementation is the prerogative of the Merchant. 3D Secure allows for liability shift in cases of fraud. 3D Secure is mandated in some geographies due to mandates from the central banks/authorities.


1

"Safer" is a relative term. Safer than what, under which conditions? Under purely theoretical conditions, assuming a brute-force attack of some kind, yes nonsense words are "safer" in the sense that it is highly likely the attacker will try a dictionary attack before an exhaustive search. In real-life conditions, dictionary attacks happen under two ...


0

As far the dictionaries are concerned, they contain a list of most commonly used passwords, and that could be nonsense phrases and words as well. For instance, x+word+123 or x+monkey are some of the most commonly used passwords along with qwerty that don’t really make sense. So, you can use nonsense passwords, but make sure that they are unpredictable and ...


47

Attackers often don't just use dictionaries, but also rules which permute the words in dictionaries. For instance, a rule could be to substitute certain letters for numbers, which look the same. This would turn Password into P455w0rd. A rule, which could apply in this case, would be to remove single letters from a word. That means just permutating the ...


17

This might seem like a question that has an obvious answer, but is not that trivial. Words that do not appear in dictionaries have more randomness ('entropy') and are thus harder to guess for computers. But they're also harder to remember for humans. And that leads to password re-use. That's very bad. If you do not use a password manager (and you should!) ...


49

The .NET Core team specifically recommends against using SecureString for new development. See the SecureString documentation: We don't recommend that you use the SecureString class for new development. For more information, see SecureString shouldn't be used on GitHub. as well as the team's reasoning on GitHub: Motivation The purpose of ...


34

Using SecureString correctly is difficult, and protects against a threat surface that is unlikely for most use cases. As you say, if an attacker can read your memory, you have other problems. I would advise to use normal strings instead of SecureString, unless you are worried by attackers carrying liquid nitrogen with physical access to your server. If you ...


0

I don't know what a "http digest file" is. If you mean a password validation database created with htaccess, then the format of the hashed password entries is very well documented, and is very unlikely to use a md5 function directly (it may use smd5). The point of hashing a password is to make it hard to recover the plaintext.


1

32-hex hashes are impossible to indirectly verify, programatically or heuristically. The only way to verify is directly - by actually cracking at least one. For future searchers, according to this Arch Linux page, ruTorrent password hashes are straight MD5, and not some kind of nested/truncated/salted variant: $ echo -n "tom:rtorrent:secret_pass" | md5sum |...


0

There's no way to do this with Crunch that I'm aware of. The only way I know of to do this is the generate all masks that conform to the composition rules using the policygen tool from the PACK toolkit, as described in my answer here. In your case, it would be something like: $ policygen --minlength=8 --maxlength=12 \ --mindigit=2 --minlower=1 --...


0

Google app passwords sidestep two-factor authentication. To mitigate the risks of doing this, Google app passwords have two key benefits (for both the user, and for the Google ecosystem as a whole): Google app passwords are hard to guess (unrelated to anything about the user) because they are randomly generated, and long. This makes it less likely for an ...


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