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0

I prefer using KeepassXC for this. Then, you can use Portable KeepassXC if you are on Windows. Or, you can use the .appimage program from the KeepassXC download page if you are on Linux. Disclaimer: I don't know if this is as secure as the Yubikey. But the advantage is the KeepassXC KDBX file is already encrypted. It is better than using a text file to store ...


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Most websites send the password as plain, or base-64 encoding (basic auth), and rely on the TLS layer for hiding the password. This is common practice, and is as safe as the TLS layer is really secured. But TLS is not perfect either. In practice, most corporations include an Interception Proxy in their security chain. They added their own root CA to the ...


0

Don't roll your own crypto. There are lots of "team" password managers available already which provide APIs you can access, however they vary in the level of sophistication of implementation. A reasonably correct model to follow is that the data is encrypted with a master key. Then each user account on the password manager gets a copy of this ...


0

This is exactly the kind of problem that vault was designed to solve. Once you authenticate to the vault you get a temporary token, then based on the policies associated with your token you can read or write key/value pairs that you want to keep secret. The vault encrypts your secrets and stores them in a backend database. Only the vault has the ...


0

You can use TPM version 2.0 for securing the keys that encrypts your database or passwords. TPM is cheap and fairly secure. As an idea you can store your key under Endorsement heirarchy and encrypts your database or password with that key. This will atleast provide you some level security but if someone got the access of system they can still decrypt the ...


0

Just to note that if you are checking the hashes of weak passwords, and if someone can see what hashes you've queried, then in some cases it can be easy to guess what password or passwords you're looking up. If you ask for the list of hashes starting with 5baa6, then it's (probably) very highly likely that you're testing the string password. If you ask for ...


15

The design flaw is not in the cryptographic binding between the prover (key) and verifier (car). It's in the communication channel. HOTP is a secure way to generate tokens but it doesn't secure the channel. HOTP can be only used in keyfob with remote locking/unlocking. NFC devices have an unfixable problem of relay attacks on which attacks against keyfobs ...


65

RFC 4226 (HOTP) would still be vulnerable to replay attacks in some situations. In the case of old fashioned key fobs, where you have to press a button to unlock the car, imagine someone who has brief access to the key fob while you are out of range of the car. The attacker can press the button once, record the code transmitted by the fob, and then hurry ...


0

I would argue that the main insecurity comes from this: The website does NOT require you to set a new password after you login with the newly created password. In a best case scenario the flow would be like this: You request password reset A new password or URL with token is sent to your email The password or URL has a lifespan of 30 minutes Upon entering ...


1

Have I Been Pwned is the famous service that does this. There are others. They are often paid services, though. You can also download password lists and check new passwords against it.


17

"If a website emails a password in cleartext when you use the "forgot password" function, is there any possibility that the password is hashed?" Yes, of course. The site might (it actually ought to) store the password in hashed form, and send it to you when it is generated in plain text, then erase it from its memory. The latter is good ...


2

Absolutely. This is quite common for initial passwords. You set up a new account, the system generates a password, emails it to the user, but it is properly hashed and stored server-side. Microsoft 365 does this, for example. It usually means that the emailed password triggers a reset once you use it. It might be better if the password is set by the user, ...


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A good practice would be redirecting user to page, where one can set up new password. Link to password reset page can be emailed. Sending password in plaintext is not secure. If it happens, then page should require to change it after initial login. There are sites sending you your password in plaintext - it means it is not kept hashed in DB: https://...


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When you don't use "padding" the size of an encrypted message corresponds mostly linearly to the size of the clear text message. A 10 character clear text message will have a much shorter encrypted message than a 1 TB clear text message. The current HTTPS specification, the TLS 1.3 specification allows for but does not mandate specific padding: ...


7

HTTPS leaks password length only roughly based on input. For example, AES CBC operates with with blocks of 128 bits. If total plaintext size is dividable by block size without remainder, then ciphertext size will match plaintext size. If not, then plaintext is padded with bits to make plaintext message dividable by 128 without remainder and only then ...


0

Please note there are multiple schools of thought regarding passwords. I would recommend using a password manager. Ok, you will need to memorize the master password protecting the password manager database, but everything else is stored there. This satisfies: "Each password you choose must be new and different": You generate a new random password ...


2

Mike Ounsworth's answer explains the standard way that passwords are sent from a client to a server - i.e. the client has the password in plaintext, the client sends the password 'in plaintext' through an SSL/TLS encrypted tunnel, then the server receives the password in plainttext. See more on this at Is it ok to send plain-text password over HTTPS?. ...


1

The fundamental problem with determining password strength is it’s entropy… you can’t predict it or calculate it easily (and not in isolation). (entropy is the amount of unpredictability of the bits used in the password) All password strength indicators are therefor meaningless… except as an indicator. But for an indication length is also a really good ...


4

I think the short answer is that TLS provides encryption in transit over the internet, but the password needs to exist in plaintext on both the browser and the server, and usually little is done to protect or obfuscate it there. Your browser will establish an encrypted TLS session with the server; which means the wifi access point, your home router, routers ...


3

... but I'm wondering whether anyone has collected some amount of data gathering the modal password strength requirements? A Second Look at Password Composition Policies in the Wild: Comparing Samples from 2010 and 2016 from Usenix 2017 has collected password policies and strength requirements from many web sites. In this paper you'll find also links to ...


0

You can create a password for the user, then encrypt the password using the user's ssh public key (which you already have), then send the user the encrypted password. Then, the user can decrypt the encrypted password using their ssh private key. See https://superuser.com/questions/576506/how-to-use-ssh-rsa-public-key-to-encrypt-a-text for how to encrypt/...


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The easiest solution is to use PowerShell cmdlet Export-Clixml. <snippet> Example 3: Encrypt an exported credential object on Windows In this example, given a credential that you've stored in the $Credential variable by running the Get-Credential cmdlet, you can run the Export-Clixml cmdlet to save the credential to disk. Important Export-Clixml only ...


1

Would it protect the passwords from another application which is potentially malicious? No DPAPI (of which CryptProtectData is a part) cannot protect against a malicious application running under the same user. This is because any application running under the same user can request decryption of a DPAPI encrypted blob. It is possible to give DPAPI some ...


1

There are legitimate reasons for why a user may not have their authenticator with them, such as: They have lost access to their authenticator (lost, stolen, etc...) Their authenticator broke Their authenticator is not compatible with the device they try to access your site from There are several possible ways to react to this now, and it's best to offer ...


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No. The reason being that they collect all the data they can from your bank when they get access. They get information about all of your loans and payment history. They can then sell or lose this information. It's a huge privacy problem. It's also totally unnecessary. They should be able to do low cost transfers in and out using only the checking information....


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