82

You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names. I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable and descriptive host names. This is how I would assess those conflicting measures: Use unpredictable host names Benefit(s) An ...


51

Data destruction is a technique of last resort. If you are planning to use a new storage device, you should use full disk encryption. This allows you to either destroy the encrypted master key or simply forget the password, effectively rendering all data unrecoverable, despite no data actually being wiped. Encryption is a solution for both solid state and ...


42

You cannot hide HTML and expect the browser to be able to interpret it. The browser needs access to the HTML in order to display the site. As soon as the browser has access to it, the user can also gain access to it. On a further note, JavaScript is also not able to "hide" the content of the site and still make it accessible to the browser, and thus the end ...


32

Everybody's (me included) reflex answer to such a question will normally be: Huh huh huh (falls off chair). No! How would you think this could even work? Executables are signed nowadays, which prevents them from being modified! However, if you consider "exe" files in general, not just those from a fresh naked Windows install, the answer must be: Careful!. ...


26

Well, IMHO the only reliable way to prevent the user to know the mail address it to have the mail sent server side instead of client side. Said differently the client only gives their own mail address and the text, it is uploaded to the server by the form, and the mail is sent by the server application which is the only part knowing the recipient address. ...


20

The fact that there is no readily available information to support your conclusion, should give you some idea about its validity. The point is, that if your attacker is already in, he will need to do some additional foot-printing anyway. Your host name may be database.xyz.intranet, but if the nmap gives you 1521 (oracle), 1433 (sql server) or 5432(Postgress)...


18

Windows system executables do not contain any sensitive information. They may reveal the version of the operating system you are using, but personal information is not stored in executables. Instead, it is stored in configuration files or databases kept throughout the system. While it would be theoretically possible to store sensitive information in ...


15

What you're advocating for is called "security though obscurity". While in theory obscurity does provide some extra protection while not making things worse, it usually does make things worse in practice. It (1) adds complexity to the system which leads to errors, (2) dilutes the understanding of what information is secret and what isn't, and (3) may have a ...


14

You can't. The question doesn't even make sense on a conceptual level. A mailto: link is simply a convenient way to communicate to an end user where they can send email to. If your mailto link works, the end user will by definition know where the email is going to, the same way the end user will by definition know where a link they're clicking will be going ...


13

Tl;dr: Because you can never trust all storage drives to securely wipe themselves, you must plan as if none of your drives can be securely wiped. Placing a dependency on the type of media is not the right way to approach the problem, because the technology is always evolving and changing, and you can never be in 100% control of all IT spend. Remember that ...


9

When your organization is subject to the GDPR, then it should have a designated Data Protection Officer. This person is responsible for ensuring that data protection laws are applied within the organization. This should be the first place to report to.


8

They can contain file paths from the system they were compiled on, which may be sensitive if these are programs you compiled on your own system.


8

If you encrypt the disk from the start, when you first start using it, then this isn't a problem. All data you write is encrypted and remapped sectors just lead to encrypted data being remanent on the over-provisioned area. Since the data is encrypted, you can't do anything with it even if you recover it using direct flash reads on a disassembled SSD. ...


7

FDE does not need to know anything about overprovisioning. If the partition is encrypted, no plain-text will ever be written anywhere. Blocks reserved for wear leveling will either have un-initialized random data, or encrypted blocks. If you are using the encryption provided by the controller, encryption/decryption occurs inside the controller, so no plain ...


5

In the blog post about the new feature, Signal says: Message contents are end-to-end encrypted with the Signal Protocol as normal, but the “envelope” containing the sender certificate as well as the message ciphertext is then also encrypted using the sender and recipient identity keys: The feature is designed to hide the sender of the message from plain ...


4

Hiding who is sending the message is indeed the intent of the feature. In many cases it should be effective, but as they note in their blog post, there are still improvements to be done: These protocol changes are an incremental step, and we are continuing to work on improvements to Signal’s metadata resistance. In particular, additional resistance to ...


4

What you are seeing is a cached view of the previous partitions. If they appear to persist even after a wipe, this is a result of the kernel caching the last known partition table in memory. It does this because it does not expect the layout to change at runtime, so rather than re-read the table each time the partition layout is queried, it reads it once at ...


2

As far as data security is concerned, the partitions are almost meaningless. If you're trying to prevent forensics from reading your data, then it won't matter. If you've run a proper multi-pass shredder over the data, then the partitions will only matter if you named them something telling. Addendum: I've obviously hit someone's sore spot by suggesting a ...


2

Yes! This is fantastic practice and a core element of modern security. What you’re describing is security engineering at its core: that is, taking 2 problems (developing and securing a product) where some may only acknowledge 1 (the former) and solving both simultaneously. As with any economics, good security engineering makes it cheaper and easier and more ...


2

Unsure where this is really relevant, but what you describe looks like a separation of concern. It is used for example in Java with aspects. The developper code the business rule classes without worrying about the authorizations required to run the methods. Then the authorization rules are implemented in an aspect, basically wrapping the methods. The well ...


2

While exposing specific version numbers is considered a bad practice and is not recommended, in this case I do not really see an issue. It is likely that the version is also displayed as a comment in the CSS file (and often also in JS files). It's quite easy to identify the version for such files (not 100% reliable but 99 out of a 100 times it will work) ...


2

Is the security level of current widely used application such as WhatsApp, Telegram or Facebook Messenger sufficient for us to transfer the sensitive data? I believe this method is the most widely used by public users now. Facebook Messenger and Telegram doesn't use end to end encryption by default. Your data is encrypted during transmission, but Facebook ...


2

This is not just an issue with 3rd parties - banks have strict regulations about what PII they can use in development environments if controls are not up to the same strictness as production environment. The usual route is anonymisation or pseudo-anonymisation. From https://gdpr.report/news/2017/11/07/data-masking-anonymisation-pseudonymisation/: With ...


2

Is there a way to encrypt incoming data from Plaid and make it available to the user through a web UI, without me being able to decrypt it as the developer of the app? Yes. Encrypt it using the public key of the end user, and implement the client such that the private key - which is in their hands, and no one else's - decrypts the data for their ...


2

This may depend on what files the webserver's user may have access to. But, this user should at least have access to the files related to the webserver. This could include viewing application source code (to help find additional, more severe issues like RCE), configuration files (possibly containing sensitive information such as database credentials which ...


1

Strongly encrypt it to AES-128 or stronger. I like the ones with physical keys, like the iStorage; they are self contained and you can't mess up installing the software. It you can't trust the computer, boot from the USB so it's only running your software. (Of course you can't trust the hardware either...) See 2 and 4. Simply throw away the encryption key ...


1

First of all, most computer repair places are not fully equiped forensics labs; so, they will probably only be able to see what you've saved since your last reset. Now, if your computer repair guy is actually a data forensics expert moonlighting as a repair guy, it's a different story. When you delete data from a computer, all the data stays there but the ...


1

You could use a synchronization service, like SyncThing or Resilio to pull data from the public server. When the users fill the forms, put them on the public server (on a protected folder), and use SyncThing/Resilio to send it to the private server. Use a cronjob on the private server to load the forms on your database. Both use data encryption and ...


1

Internal / company specific applications may well contain sensitive algorithms (eg pricing/discounting rules, fraud detection). They might be analysed by hostile parties for security flaws. Revealing which versions of Commercial / third party applications are actively used (especially if not fully up-to-date with security patches) may also allow hostile ...


1

Firstly, my understanding is that an SSD that properly implements the secure erase command will erase the unallocated blocks, although it may be unable to erase retired/failed blocks (these are blocks that have worn out and no longer operate correctly) and in theory these could contain recoverable data. Secondly, HDDs also include reserved space. Most ...


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