New answers tagged

0

Or if an attacker can access this information, should you just assume that they've already pwned you enough to know it? I think you already got the idea here. If you can't trust your own machine, it doesn't matter how the password manager is implemented, you're already screwed. You can add a second layer of authentication in various ways. On local machine, ...


1

The RFC's dont technically deal with standards for code signing or TLS/SSL per se. Rather, they set the standards for x.509 certificates and PKI. Such as how you should construct a x.509 certificate using asn1 (RFC 5280) and then how it should be encoded to create a certificate. The standards for TLS/SSL and code signing certificates which are issued by ...


1

There is actually more to putting certificates on the card than just a software. You have two options when putting certificates on the card: The private key is generated on the card alongside with the CSR that is sent to the CA for signing and the cert is then installed on the card. This is the preferred option for authentication certificates, the fact that ...


3

I would keep using openssh Assuming a 'normal' server, with no resources problem but only about concerned about the security benefits, I would keep using openssh. It has an excellent security record. While the list of CVE is a long one, analysis shows those are -particularly for one-user servers- actually relatively minor. Those not covering DDoS mostly go ...


Top 50 recent answers are included