58

If implemented correctly, AES is AES; the output between two different implementations is identical, and therefore no distinction is possible in after-the-fact comparison -- if done correctly, the one is exactly the same as the other. But there are a few points where differences can crop in: Operation Mode Truecrypt implements a modified counter mode ...


47

At this point, it is still unclear. Speculation runs rampant as to whether it's a defacement or official retirement. That said, it is noteworthy that the latest version of TrueCrypt (before the 7.2 version that's now posted) is over two years old. Also no apparent efforts have been made to support whole-disk encryption on Windows 8, which even older than ...


43

The main obstacle of a TrueCrypt fork is the non-standard TrueCrypt license. While the intention of the authors seemed to be to write a share-alike license similar in spirit to the GPL, the license has a few quite unorthodox passages which can be interpreted in a way which puts unreasonable conditions on a fork. These conditions prevented the Open Source ...


41

I would still choose TrueCrypt for a matter of trust and the "many eyes" theory: After the "TrueCrypt scandal" everyone started looking at the source for backdoors. The TrueCrypt audit finished on April 2, 2015. They found low-risk vulnerabilities, including some that affect the bootloader full-disk-encryption feature, though there is no evidence of ...


39

For virtually all disk encryption tools, your encryption key will be stored in RAM while the computer is in use or in sleep mode. This of course presents a fairly significant vulnerability, because if someone can dump the contents of your RAM while keeping its contents intact, it is likely they can extract the key from the RAM dump using widely available ...


36

Your first question is really a legal one, and you seem to be assuming two things: The attacker is a government of some sort. That government actually respects citizen privacy and requires some sort of reasonable suspicion before it can force people to give up encryption keys. Neither of those assumptions are necessarily true. For all you know, some random ...


33

Yes. Use VeraCrypt. As of September 26th 2015, google's security researchers found a couple of vulnerabilities that affect TrueCrypt 7.1a and VeraCrypt 1.14 they are CVE-2015-7358 and CVE-2015-7359 On September 26th, 2015 VeraCrypt released 1.15 which fixes those vulnerabilities. On October 17th, 2016, VeraCrypt's audit by the QuarksLab has been ...


22

The security of a cipher depends on its specific implementation in a software utility. As far as I know, there are no known AES implementation issues in 7-Zip or TrueCrypt. AES is a fast cipher, and hardware acceleration features such as AES-NI make it much faster. So protecting against brute-force requires strengthening the key through key extension ...


20

http://www.autohotkey.com/board/topic/86586-tcbrute-2-truecrypt-bruteforce-password-recovery/ seems like exactly what you're after. The other one to try is OTFBrutusGUI - which can be had from http://www.tateu.net/software/ - though it has little documentation beyond scattered forum posts (such as http://www.tateu.net/forum/index.php and http://www....


19

That's as good as encryption is gonna get. TrueCrypt is a well-vetted, respected piece of software for disk encryption. There are no guarantees in life, but TrueCrypt is about as good as it gets today. The primary remaining risk is not that someone is going to find a cryptanalytic weakness in TrueCrypt and break TrueCrypt's encryption algorithms. Rather, ...


19

My name is an alias, and I am a professional paranoiac. If you start from the philosophically cynical position that every piece of technology required to produce and distribute information is potentially compromised, then you will have difficulty accepting any current successful theory of information security. Take the simple case of a desktop computer ...


19

The criticisms about XTS make sense in a context when attackers can observe successive versions of the encrypted disk (i.e. the attacker steals your laptop, makes an image of the whole disk, then puts the laptop back in your bag, and you did not notice anything; and he does it again tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and so on...). With XTS, every 16-byte ...


19

You're wrong in your assumptions. There are many legal jurisdictions where you can be required to produce passwords for encrypted data on suspicion, rather than proof, that the data may be relevant to a criminal investigation. If you don't provide your password, you can be jailed. But if there's no encrypted volume visible, they don't know to do it. For ...


18

If you write random bytes to an entire device, and then create a headerless (no LUKS or TrueCrypt) encrypted block at a random point on the device, then this is not something that can be detected. For example on Linux; Take a 100GB HDD. Fill it with random data: dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/sda bs=4K Create an encrypted loopback device at a 'random' point ...


17

Backing up the TrueCrypt container means that you'll end with a timeline of your encrypted volume, and all of those versions share the same key. Having different versions of the container with the same key gives the adversary two advantages: Information leakage: The adversary will know which sectors of the volume changed. and, as a consequence, a compromise ...


16

A backdoor could possibly exist, an easy way to achieve this would be to encrypt the passphrase with a public key and store it somewhere with the data portion on the hard disk, so the passphrase could be recovered with the matching private key. However, TrueCrypt is open source can be peer reviewed: From the TrueCrypt FAQ I forgot my password – is there ...


16

NO, it is not safe. Truecrypt uses the XTS block mode for encryption, which has severe problems when your adversary is able to see snapshots over time of how the data changes. In fact, an article called You Don't Want XTS, intended for software developers to learn when they can and can't use XTS, specifically uses Dropbox as an example of when NOT to use XTS....


15

Modern research seems to indicate that performing a single zero-pass of a hard drive is sufficient for most data dispositions. In which case, no, performing a file or partition encryption would not be faster. Except in the case of hardware accelerated encryption (such as the newer Intel i series processors) encryption speed is CPU bound, whereas a single ...


15

Edit: October 3, 2015 An article in IT World for September 29, 2015 reveals the existence of, but doesn't describe fully, two serious flaws in the Windows driver that TrueCrypt installed. It isn't clear from the article whether those flaws compromise the crypto or the underlying Windows OS, or both. It also isn't clear whether that driver is installed only ...


14

Significantly, TrueCrypt version 7.2 was certified with the official TrueCrypt private signing key. That suggested the page warning TrueCrypt isn't safe wasn't a hoax posted by hackers who managed to gain unauthorized access. After all, someone with the ability to sign new TrueCrypt releases probably wouldn't squander that hack with a prank. Alternatively, ...


14

Hard disk encryption is not supposed to alter SSD life time: "encrypted" bits are not harder to read or write than "normal" bits, and (properly done) encryption does not enlarge data. Indeed, the SSD device has no idea whether what it is asked to read or write is encrypted or not. One megabyte is one megabyte. (Edit: about "encrypting empty space": this ...


13

First a bit of background; Truecrypt uses a classic 2-stage approach: There is a small volume header, which the end user can decrypt with his password. Inside this header there is a master encryption key, which is the one Truecrypt uses to encrypt and decrypt the main user data volume. So your task right now is to recover or re-create the original volume ...


12

Loosely-speaking, you can treat the Keyfile as something you have. You can store it on a USB stick for that sole purpose. Whenever you want to decrypt your secret file, you plug that stick and decrypt. You can add an extra layer of security by making that USB stick a TrueCrypt volume, thus protecting your Keyfile with a password. Of course, you can hide ...


12

Nobody asserts that "TrueCrypt is secure". However some people assert that they looked at the TrueCrypt entrails and found nothing bad about it, and are reasonably convinced that the development of TrueCrypt followed consistent and sane practices which ought to result in a product which achieves security or at least a relatively low number of vulnerabilities....


12

Before this change, there was a gpg public key on their website. If this was for real, I dare say they would at least have signed the message. Besides, Truecrypt is an open source project so there is no way that "development has ceased. Anybody could continue development or fix bugs. Lots of free and open source software is largely maintained by a community....


11

The problem is that most multi-factor authentication methods are just that--authentication. They often require some code to verify the validity of the token or information you present. However, with disk encryption your password is the actual encryption key. There is no gatekeeper involved, either your key unencrypts the data or it doesn't. I have used ...


11

In good crypto systems (like TrueCrypt), knowing the encryption algorithm should not give you any advantage in cracking the encryption, and indeed it doesn't. For all of your randomly-generated passwords, it's safe to say that the encrypted disks will remain encrypted forever; you'll never be able to brute-force the key/password. As for your other password (...


11

As of the latest information, the main problem with Truecrypt right now is that it is no longer supported and maintained. This is of significant importance as we expect the phase 2 audit report from iSec because it means that if serious flaws are found in the encryption used or the implementation of it, then those flaws will not be fixed by the developers. ...


11

BitLocker uses AES in CBC mode, TrueCrypt and others use AES/Twofish/Serpent/cascades in XTS mode (Wikipedia: Block cipher mode of operation). CBC mode is less secure in that it allows single bit manipulation. For example, an attacker having physical access can switch a specific bit of data and returns it to you; this can open a backdoor loophole via ...


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