47

At this point, it is still unclear. Speculation runs rampant as to whether it's a defacement or official retirement. That said, it is noteworthy that the latest version of TrueCrypt (before the 7.2 version that's now posted) is over two years old. Also no apparent efforts have been made to support whole-disk encryption on Windows 8, which even older than ...


43

The main obstacle of a TrueCrypt fork is the non-standard TrueCrypt license. While the intention of the authors seemed to be to write a share-alike license similar in spirit to the GPL, the license has a few quite unorthodox passages which can be interpreted in a way which puts unreasonable conditions on a fork. These conditions prevented the Open Source ...


42

I would still choose TrueCrypt for a matter of trust and the "many eyes" theory: After the "TrueCrypt scandal" everyone started looking at the source for backdoors. The TrueCrypt audit finished on April 2, 2015. They found low-risk vulnerabilities, including some that affect the bootloader full-disk-encryption feature, though there is no evidence of ...


39

For virtually all disk encryption tools, your encryption key will be stored in RAM while the computer is in use or in sleep mode. This of course presents a fairly significant vulnerability, because if someone can dump the contents of your RAM while keeping its contents intact, it is likely they can extract the key from the RAM dump using widely available ...


38

Your first question is really a legal one, and you seem to be assuming two things: The attacker is a government of some sort. That government actually respects citizen privacy and requires some sort of reasonable suspicion before it can force people to give up encryption keys. Neither of those assumptions are necessarily true. For all you know, some random ...


36

Yes. Use VeraCrypt. As of September 26th 2015, google's security researchers found a couple of vulnerabilities that affect TrueCrypt 7.1a and VeraCrypt 1.14 they are CVE-2015-7358 and CVE-2015-7359 On September 26th, 2015 VeraCrypt released 1.15 which fixes those vulnerabilities. On October 17th, 2016, VeraCrypt's audit by the QuarksLab has been ...


22

The criticisms about XTS make sense in a context when attackers can observe successive versions of the encrypted disk (i.e. the attacker steals your laptop, makes an image of the whole disk, then puts the laptop back in your bag, and you did not notice anything; and he does it again tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and so on...). With XTS, every 16-byte ...


19

My name is an alias, and I am a professional paranoiac. If you start from the philosophically cynical position that every piece of technology required to produce and distribute information is potentially compromised, then you will have difficulty accepting any current successful theory of information security. Take the simple case of a desktop computer ...


19

You're wrong in your assumptions. There are many legal jurisdictions where you can be required to produce passwords for encrypted data on suspicion, rather than proof, that the data may be relevant to a criminal investigation. If you don't provide your password, you can be jailed. But if there's no encrypted volume visible, they don't know to do it. For ...


18

NO, it is not safe. Truecrypt uses the XTS block mode for encryption, which has severe problems when your adversary is able to see snapshots over time of how the data changes. In fact, an article called You Don't Want XTS, intended for software developers to learn when they can and can't use XTS, specifically uses Dropbox as an example of when NOT to use XTS....


17

Backing up the TrueCrypt container means that you'll end with a timeline of your encrypted volume, and all of those versions share the same key. Having different versions of the container with the same key gives the adversary two advantages: Information leakage: The adversary will know which sectors of the volume changed. and, as a consequence, a compromise ...


14

Significantly, TrueCrypt version 7.2 was certified with the official TrueCrypt private signing key. That suggested the page warning TrueCrypt isn't safe wasn't a hoax posted by hackers who managed to gain unauthorized access. After all, someone with the ability to sign new TrueCrypt releases probably wouldn't squander that hack with a prank. Alternatively, ...


14

Hard disk encryption is not supposed to alter SSD life time: "encrypted" bits are not harder to read or write than "normal" bits, and (properly done) encryption does not enlarge data. Indeed, the SSD device has no idea whether what it is asked to read or write is encrypted or not. One megabyte is one megabyte. (Edit: about "encrypting empty space": this ...


14

Edit: October 3, 2015 An article in IT World for September 29, 2015 reveals the existence of, but doesn't describe fully, two serious flaws in the Windows driver that TrueCrypt installed. It isn't clear from the article whether those flaws compromise the crypto or the underlying Windows OS, or both. It also isn't clear whether that driver is installed only ...


12

Nobody asserts that "TrueCrypt is secure". However some people assert that they looked at the TrueCrypt entrails and found nothing bad about it, and are reasonably convinced that the development of TrueCrypt followed consistent and sane practices which ought to result in a product which achieves security or at least a relatively low number of vulnerabilities....


12

Before this change, there was a gpg public key on their website. If this was for real, I dare say they would at least have signed the message. Besides, Truecrypt is an open source project so there is no way that "development has ceased. Anybody could continue development or fix bugs. Lots of free and open source software is largely maintained by a community....


12

BitLocker uses AES in CBC mode, TrueCrypt and others use AES/Twofish/Serpent/cascades in XTS mode (Wikipedia: Block cipher mode of operation). CBC mode is less secure in that it allows single bit manipulation. For example, an attacker having physical access can switch a specific bit of data and returns it to you; this can open a backdoor loophole via ...


11

Barring implementation bugs, 7-Zip's encryption is more robust than TrueCrypt's, because TrueCrypt has a much harder job. Sector-level full-disk encryption is hard: You have a fixed amount of space, any part of which may be changed at any time. You have only a relatively small amount of space to save for metadata. If you keep more than a few bits of ...


11

In good crypto systems (like TrueCrypt), knowing the encryption algorithm should not give you any advantage in cracking the encryption, and indeed it doesn't. For all of your randomly-generated passwords, it's safe to say that the encrypted disks will remain encrypted forever; you'll never be able to brute-force the key/password. As for your other password (...


11

As of the latest information, the main problem with Truecrypt right now is that it is no longer supported and maintained. This is of significant importance as we expect the phase 2 audit report from iSec because it means that if serious flaws are found in the encryption used or the implementation of it, then those flaws will not be fixed by the developers. ...


11

For Samsung 850 drives and other SSDs, your best and most secure option is to use the OPAL full-disk encryption by enabling a drive password in your system's BIOS. The way the encryption on these SSDs works is that the drive is always encrypted -- it comes from the factory with an encryption key generated and set. All data it writes and reads is encrypted/...


10

Data from any running program might end up in swap, so your swap space needs to be encrypted as well. Unless you want to hibernate your system, the swap space can be encrypted with a random key that is generated at each boot. This is the case by default if you select full-disk encryption during installation but not if you merely later encrypt your home ...


10

When using disk encryption, the data is encoded before being written and decoded before being read. The encryption/decryption happens on the RAM rather than the SSD itself so in reality there is no extra read/writes apart from the metadata used for the encryption layer which is negligible. Synetech made a graphic on Super User to illustrate this: *...


9

Disclaimer: I'm the author of cryptsetup-deluks and grub-crypto-deluks. Deniable encryption is only a part of the solution. There's no perfect solution to protect yourself and your data if you get caught by an adversary. You can hardly avoid the suspicion of encryption, even if the adversary can't prove it. I'll list the issues and solutions. Short partial ...


9

Edit: October 3, 2015 An article in IT World for September 29, 2015 reveals the existence of, but doesn't describe fully, two serious flaws in the Windows driver that TrueCrypt installed. It isn't clear from the article whether those flaws compromise the crypto or the underlying Windows OS, or both. It also isn't clear whether that driver is installed only ...


8

In special means to the licences of TrueCrypt there are already running discussion: Simply because the main people behind the project are anonymous (some think they are from Eastern Europe like Czech) and given the possibility of National Security Letters (like lavabit) it would also be better for them to stay under the cover (Sidenote: it would be enough if ...


8

An attacker could perform what's known as a "cold boot" attack. Sleep mode keeps all the contents of memory active, and the key for your truecrypt volume is stored in memory. The memory contents persist longer without power when the memory is cold. All an attacker has to do is cool down the computer (say by putting it in a freezer), and reboot the machine ...


7

Source-available (SA) differs from true open-source (OS) that there is no right to fork. That means when a security flaw in a SA software gets known and the developers refuse to fix it (which doesn't have to be out of bad intentions - it could just be lack of resources), users do not have the option to fork the project and continue the project under a new ...


7

This is a good starting point to learn how the Mask Attack from oclHashcat works: https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=mask_attack You need to add the commandline-parameter -a 3 so hashcat knows your going to use a mask attack. Hashcat comes with some predefined mask's (you can define your own also): ?l = abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ?u = ...


7

VeraCrypt is a fork of the now abandoned TrueCrypt project. I really wonder where you have found the information that TrueCrypt was safer than VeraCrypt. More exactly, it may have been true in the early times of the fork, if some security patches had been implemented in TrueCrypt before being ported in VeraCrypt. But as TrueCrypt is no longer maintained, ...


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