69

The main problem with passwords is not password complexity, but password reuse (obligatory xkcd). One service leaks logins and passwords, suddenly lots of providers see a surge on account hijacks. Why? Because we humans cannot remember dozens of different passwords, so we create one password for common services, and one for special ones. But most of us will ...


63

Any encryption is vulnerable to brute force attack, for example AES-256 has 2^256 keys, and given enough hardware we can “easily” brute force it. The problem is that there’s not enough silicon on Earth to construct enough processors to do it before the heat death of the universe. The fact that encryption can be bruteforced doesn’t mean that this will happen ...


41

I would still choose TrueCrypt for a matter of trust and the "many eyes" theory: After the "TrueCrypt scandal" everyone started looking at the source for backdoors. The TrueCrypt audit finished on April 2, 2015. They found low-risk vulnerabilities, including some that affect the bootloader full-disk-encryption feature, though there is no evidence of ...


33

Yes. Use VeraCrypt. As of September 26th 2015, google's security researchers found a couple of vulnerabilities that affect TrueCrypt 7.1a and VeraCrypt 1.14 they are CVE-2015-7358 and CVE-2015-7359 On September 26th, 2015 VeraCrypt released 1.15 which fixes those vulnerabilities. On October 17th, 2016, VeraCrypt's audit by the QuarksLab has been ...


26

Definitely take Thorium's answer seriously. However, I figured I might as well try to address your actual question too. You'll hear this all the time on a security board like this, but I'll say it anyway: the answer always depends on your anticipated threat vector. I'll focus on brute-force attacks by people who aren't specifically targeting you (because ...


20

Didn't veracrypt creators know about this issue? (Not having brute-force protection) As Andrew Morozko notes in his answer, they have addressed this – as far as it is possible – by using a secure key-generation function (PBKDF2) and high iteration counts. This severely limits the ability to brute-force (assuming the password is long- and random-enough1)...


13

This is extremely insecure. I'm glad you asked elsewhere before running this setup yourself! I hope those 3000+ people on AskUbuntu were similarly cautious. So, why is this insecure? What can an attacker do if you put them in the group? That group will be able to elevate privileges to root. The reason is simple: VeraCrypt allows mounting an encrypted volume ...


12

"Evil maid" attacks can be anything that is done to a machine via physical access while it is turned off, even though it's encrypted. The name comes from the idea that an attacker could infiltrate or pay off the cleaning staff wherever you're staying to compromise your laptop while you're out. For an encrypted device, the most likely evil maid attacks are ...


10

Will the created containers still be bitwise comparable? No. Veracrypt stores different containers with different encryption keys, even if you use the same password. So the containers won't be bitwise identical. You'll need to open the container and compare the files rather than compare the container. How robust will the containers be against data loss, ...


8

As Stephen Touset already answered: The Algorithm might not be as important as you think. The only way you would want several algorithms at once is longterm security. So your bet is: One of them will be broken some day and the others maybe won't. By theory thats a good way to go. But you might face several issues with it. Some of them are possibly: Size of ...


8

Even if you use a password manager for most work, there is still value in having a consistent format derived from dictionary words. For instance, you could generate six-word passwords from a 4000-word dictionary, giving passwords like: that-feats-peers-film-wash-propaganda chrome-document-thirty-ignore-given-screen studying-mark-approved-rods-heavy-mocking ...


6

You don't change the random key with what everything is encrypted but just the encryption of this key. So yes, it is perfectly possible and therefore you have a menu entry under "System" for doing exactly this. How this works in detail is basically answered at https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/18479/how-does-truecrypt-change-password-without-the-...


6

There really is no value in double or triple encrypting data in the manner you describe. First, as a non-cryptographer, you cannot know the level to which you may compromise the crypto process. You absolutely can do that when combining algorithms. A good example of this is 3DES, which is really 3 cipher rounds of DES with the 144 bit key being three 48 bit ...


6

If you do a diff on TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt, remove all of the name change and version code, you are left with a reasonable size patch to look at. VeraCrypt uses SHA256, which is better than SHA512 because of the key schedule. Besides the aforementioned iteration count, the other notable changes are NTFS support, upgraded WxWidgit support, volume format ...


5

VeraCrypt is a fork of the now abandoned TrueCrypt project. I really wonder where you have found the information that TrueCrypt was safer than VeraCrypt. More exactly, it may have been true in the early times of the fork, if some security patches had been implemented in TrueCrypt before being ported in VeraCrypt. But as TrueCrypt is no longer maintained, ...


5

Can malicious program open a file from mounted container? If the volume is mounted, any process that has the rights to read the mounted filesystem will be able to open files in it exactly as if it were unencrypted. As soon as it is mounted, it is not encrypted at all from the perspective of the computer. This encryption can only provide data-at-rest ...


4

AES-256 is perfectly adequate (in fact, AES-128 is perfectly sufficient too, and arguably better according to some experts' opinion) to protect any data that you may have, provided that Your password is not only long (as you stated) but also not guessable. The software you use has no backdoor (Veracrypt to my knowledge doesn't have one). However, the mere ...


4

To begin, I'll break down the main difference between FDE and File-level Encryption: Full-Disk Encryption: FDE works on the hardware level of a device. It encrypts the entire drive as compared to individual files and ensures that data cannot be read even if the drive is connected to an alternate system. It ensures that a user must have a password to even ...


4

There are no such mechanisms and the reason is that they would not be cost effective. The cost for such a technique is initially high because it is unclear how to realize it. You suggest that the receiver of a password somehow add noise to the input stream. For that you need the application that uses passwords to act a a keyboard. While this is possible it ...


4

I don't think you will be able to guarantee that. So, let's assume you have a command that takes the password in a prompt, eg. echo mypassword | cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/disk volume` And want to ask for the password once and open several volumes: #!/bin/sh set -e read -p "What's the password? " password || exit 1 for disk in disk1 disk2 disk3; do ...


4

VeraCrypt's PIM is unnecessary if you use a sufficiently strong password. What VeraCrypt's PIM is In layman's terms, VeraCrypt's PIM defines the number of times your password is hashed before being used to decrypt the disk. To be precise, each VeraCrypt volume is encrypted using a random master key. Your password is used as a base to decrypt the master ...


4

It's complicated. VeraCrypt volumes themselves appear to be random data - they're the output from an encryption routine which should be indistinguishable from random data, barring some flaw in the algorithm or implementation of the algorithm - and that applies for both volumes within files and for system encryption. VeraCrypt accepts a password, then tries ...


4

This Question provides a starting point for reading on the broad topic of different possiblities. Keep in mind that some of the answers are several years old. Anyhow, there is a lot of hints towards a good password. Also this article tells you some more about calculation times (though you should try to get the point without really depending on every word ...


3

Does method 2 address data leak vulnerabilities present when accessing files via method 1? Not at all. It just ensures that the already-protected VeraCrypt container will be saved to an encrypted space when extracted for mounting and removed safely on unmount. All applications used to open and process the files stored inside the VeraCrypt container will ...


3

The point about not reusing passwords is damage containment. You do not want a breach in one system revealing a password that grants access to other data and systems that would otherwise have remained secure. If the two usages ultimately protect the same data, then it makes sense to use the same password. Your case is a bit different: the two usages are "...


3

Veracrypt and it's predecessor Truecrypt transform plaintext disk content to cyphertext disk content on the fly. There is a one-off process to convert the plaintext to cyphertext when commissioning the hard disk. So this is a full disk re-write which is limited primarily by the speed of the hard disk. A spinning hard disk is the slowest part of the typical ...


3

Full-disk encryption is mostly a matter of convenience: you don't have to worry about determining which files are sensitive, and maintaining that list as things happen on your computer. In many situations, it's a one-time setup, and then everything continues to act exactly the same as before for the user (the encryption key is derived from the user password),...


3

I agree with you. Specifically: This is not taking into consideration of theft, but rather, something or someone infecting my machine and then being able to exploit my data. The attack vector that FDE protects you against (compared with file encryption) is a lost or stolen machine. If your machine is infected, the data is presumably already decrypted and ...


3

Literally the first google result - https://sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/discussion/technical/thread/30c2375f/ RIPEMD-160 was indeed deprecated for creating non-system volumes starting from version 1.0f released on December 30th, 2014 but it is still possible to mount volumes using RIPEMD-160 RIPEMD-160 is an old algorithm that has been deprecated by ...


3

Not really unless you are attempting to prevent people that have the bitlocker decryption key from accessing the drive, presuming you can make that work at all.


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