157

I mean, my WiFi is protected, so all the communication should be encrypted, right? It is, but not at the place you're reading it. Encryption happens at a certain point in the "pipeline", and decryption then must also happen at a certain point in the "pipeline" (otherwise the data are useless). You are observing the data after they have been decrypted, which ...


97

EDIT/UPDATE 2017-10-17: This answer does not account for KRACK. That's an attack on both WPA2-PSK and WPA2-Enterprise. There's ways to detect and mitigate it, but they're not covered here. You need to make a difference here. There's multiple things to consider. Also "WPA2" isn't precise enough – there's WPA2-PSK (pre-shared key), and WPA2-Enterprise (which ...


40

Using a router with WPA2-PSK (or any other network encryption algorithm), does not mean all sites are forced to use https. It means that that the unencrypted traffic is not visible to those who are not connected to the network. Consider HTTPS as a relationship between your browser and the website. Consider WPA2-PSK as the relationship between your device ...


20

WPA 2 is not compromised. For WPA2-PSK (pre-shared key) without WPS, only the key can be cracked using a brute-force attack or a wordlist. This can also happen offline (meaning you collect some data from a network, then crack the key without staying near that network). If you use WPA2-PSK, use a strong key. People who know this key to your network can ...


17

No password is ever sent during the 4-way handshake, therefore it cannot be phished. When a client connects to an access point (AP) using WPA2-PSK, the password or pre-shared key (PSK) is, as the name suggests, already known by both parties. So there is no need to exchange it again. Do not confuse this with other scenarios where no pre-shared secret is ...


16

There are two (main) modes in which to run WPA2. You can use enterprise mode or pre-shared key (PSK) mode. If you run in enterprise mode you need to set up an authenticating RADIUS server, and configure certificates on the clients that will connect to the access point. Furthermore you need to configure the AP will all the relevant information. This level ...


12

When you run Wireshark on a computer, you're capturing the traffic that the computer can "see". If you run Wireshark while browsing HTTP websites, the computer "sees" data in clear text, because the Wi-Fi encryption occurs at the router/access point level, which is known as "link layer". If, on the other hand, you run Wireshark while browsing HTTPS ...


11

The details of the calculation for obtaining the key are described in the link you mentioned: For WPA-PSK encryption, the binary key is derived from the passphrase according to the following formula: Key = PBKDF2(passphrase, ssid, 4096, 256) The function PBKDF2 is a standardized method to derive a key from a passphrase. It is specified in ...


11

Your point 2 is a bit inaccurate. The PTK is never sent over the air in WPA; it is computed from the PMK, an AP nonce, a client nonce, the AP MAC address, and the client MAC address (this is "key exchange", but the PTK never gets transmitted). Without the PMK, an attacker who sniffs the data can't discover the PTK without doing a brute-force attack (...


9

I had the same problem and after some research I found that everything worked fine when I disabled the wlan0 interface before running the attack. To disable the wlan0 interface, I used the following command: ifconfig wlan0 down Then I tried the following command again: aireplay-ng --deauth 1111 -a macadress-of-ap -c macadress-of-client mon0


9

You state your CMAC is 128 bits, so in general you don't need a passphrase with more than 128-bits of entropy. However, if you choose a 16 character password (without picking the bytes completely randomly), the entropy isn't 128-bits, it's typically much less. E.g., if you chose randomly from 95 printable ASCII characters, you'd have about 105 bits of ...


8

In WPA/WPA2, the SSID of the network is used as a salt to the encryption. A rainbow table therefore is only useful if the SSID used to generate it is the same as the SSID of the network you are attacking. Using a common SSID increases this chance. Source


8

WPA2 EAP-PSK uses WPA2-Enterprise to do an 802.1X authentication to server. It uses the PSK method of EAP and allows a client to authenticate with just the use of a PSK. The pros of WPA2-PSK is that it is supported in every 802.11 device of relatively recent manufacture (2nd gen 802.11g or so). It is simple to set up and simple to use. WPA2 EAP-PSK ...


7

If the attacker is sufficiently close to the access point and can connect to it, he can view all unencrypted network traffic that goes past your router by using a packet capture utility like Wireshark. Although WEP adds a slight barrier, its still easily decipherable even by unauthenticated users. On a side note: WEP has been shown to be completely broken. ...


7

Contrary to the originally accepted answer, a random multiword passphrase is not subject to what we usually mean when we say "dictionary attack" (that's when you just throw a large wordlist at a hash, one line at a time, maybe with a few rules thrown in). Such a simple attack would have no effect on a solid Diceware passphrase. Your seven-word Diceware-based ...


6

TKIP is vulnerable to an attack similar to the WEP "ChopChop" attack. TKIP uses MIC for guaranteeing the integrity of an encrypted frame. If more than two MIC failures are observed in a 60 second window, both the Access Point (AP) and client station shut down for 60 seconds. The newer TKIP attack uses a mechanism similar to the “chopchop” WEP attack to ...


6

If we assume that your passphrase was randomly generated (not influenced by human selection factors), then some basic math and a couple of tools can get you most of the way there. Your restriction #3 (each character can be used only once) is the harder one, but probably wouldn't really reduce the total combinations space very much, so I recommend setting it ...


5

WPA-PSK iterates your SSID and Pre-shared key through a HMAC-SHA1 hash function into a "raw" 256 bit key called the Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The PMK (which you are trying to brute-force) is presumably held by both the client and the router. When they are authenticating, they derive a key known as the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) using: The client and ...


5

AP accepts packets from a machine not connected to it from arbitrary senders Normally, deauthentication [and other management] frames don't have to be encrypted (i.e. require an existing authenticated 'connection' between the AP and the client). Therefore, they can be spoofed. The way to protect against this kind of attack is to use Management Frame ...


5

(This thread is cross-posted on the hashcat forums here. My answer there was too simplistic, so I'll try to do a better job here.) The basics For wordlists and rules, it sounds like you've already got the basics down. As long as the wordlists are in UTF-8, and the input method used to set the password is also UTF-8, then they should work well. I would ...


4

You should read the wiki entry on Mask Attack. In particular, you want custom charsets and the examples. First, you define up to four custom character sets, -1 through -4. Then, you put your mask together. For each character position, you can use a fixed character (19, in the first example, is a literal) a standard charset, like ?a or ?l a custom ...


4

I had a similar problem with an RTL8812AU on Kali 2018. What fixed it for me was throwing a -D into the attack command line so it stops trying to automatically determine the channel and just does what you tell it to.


4

In PSK mode, the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is derived from the passphrase. Both the supplicant and the authenticator prove that they have knowledge of the pre-shared key to one another: [Supplication to authenticator Message B] contains a MIC value and thus proves that the supplicant knows the PMK [Authenticator to supplicant Message C] verifies to ...


4

As described, the disadvantage to allowing TKIP (also known as WPA) is that there is a known weakness. AES (used in WPA2) is more robust. Setting it to a mode that allows both will allow older devices that don't support WPA2 to connect in WPA mode, while devices that do support WPA2 will use that instead. Setting it to AES only comes at the price of ...


4

If the security of your endpoint depends on security of the transport layer or anything lower-level, you've already lost the game. Even if there were no issues in WPA2, you'd be vulnerable to a compromised or fake router. Treating the network as trusted is a fundamental mistake that creates a huge attack surface and huge cost of attempting to maintain ...


4

It's still very much relevant. I took a KARMA device with me to lunch today and 76 different devices attempted to connect to it. Those are actual connection attempts, and not just probes. I have MAC address whitelisting enabled, so nothing will successfully connect, but I'll know when they try. Most OS vendors appear to have addressed the most obvious ...


4

Below is the information on frame exchange which happens between Supplicant and NAS (Server) The cipher suite is the algorithm or hash technique which is accepted by both STA and AS used for generating MSK.


3

No Any user who has the psk has the ability to decrypt all traffic encrypted with that AP using WPA2-PSK. The cipher keys are generated from that PSK all the attacker has to know is the psk and what functions the AP and Client use to generate the cipher keys, which he/she already has from previously associating themselves with access point. If the traffic ...


3

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Is defined in IEEE 802.11. It uses a 40 or 104 bit key along with a 24 bit Initialization Vector (IV), and the RC4 stream cipher. The purpose of an IV is to ensure that the same key is never used twice but for it to work the IV must never repeat. It is also important how it is combined with the actual key. WEP concatenates the ...


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