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Neil McGuigan
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I like the look of this technique for sending password reset links:

https://neosmart.net/blog/2015/using-hmac-signatures-to-avoid-database-writes/

(TLDR: don't store token in database. Send password reset link w email address, expiry time, and corresponding hmac)

especially after reading about the Mozilla / Bugzilla reset bug.

It seems like it's vulnerable to replay attacks though.

Q1: Under what circumstances is it vulnerable, assuming good HTTPS?

I think someone monitoring my network traffic (at say a wifi hotspot) would not be able to simply replay the GET request to the link, correct?

Q2: If it's only a replay attack if an attacker has access to my email or physical access to my computer, isn't token-based password reset equally vulnerable, as the attacker could simply request a new link?

I like the look of this technique for sending password reset links:

https://neosmart.net/blog/2015/using-hmac-signatures-to-avoid-database-writes/

(TLDR: don't store token in database. Send password reset link w email address, expiry time, and corresponding hmac)

especially after reading about the Mozilla / Bugzilla reset bug.

It seems like it's vulnerable to replay attacks though.

Under what circumstances is it vulnerable, assuming good HTTPS?

I think someone monitoring my network traffic (at say a wifi hotspot) would not be able to simply replay the GET request to the link, correct?

If it's only a replay attack if an attacker has access to my email or physical access to my computer, isn't token-based password reset equally vulnerable, as the attacker could simply request a new link?

I like the look of this technique for sending password reset links:

https://neosmart.net/blog/2015/using-hmac-signatures-to-avoid-database-writes/

(TLDR: don't store token in database. Send password reset link w email address, expiry time, and corresponding hmac)

especially after reading about the Mozilla / Bugzilla reset bug.

It seems like it's vulnerable to replay attacks though.

Q1: Under what circumstances is it vulnerable, assuming good HTTPS?

I think someone monitoring my network traffic (at say a wifi hotspot) would not be able to simply replay the GET request to the link, correct?

Q2: If it's only a replay attack if an attacker has access to my email or physical access to my computer, isn't token-based password reset equally vulnerable, as the attacker could simply request a new link?

Source Link
Neil McGuigan
  • 3.5k
  • 1
  • 19
  • 22

HMAC password reset link and replay attacks

I like the look of this technique for sending password reset links:

https://neosmart.net/blog/2015/using-hmac-signatures-to-avoid-database-writes/

(TLDR: don't store token in database. Send password reset link w email address, expiry time, and corresponding hmac)

especially after reading about the Mozilla / Bugzilla reset bug.

It seems like it's vulnerable to replay attacks though.

Under what circumstances is it vulnerable, assuming good HTTPS?

I think someone monitoring my network traffic (at say a wifi hotspot) would not be able to simply replay the GET request to the link, correct?

If it's only a replay attack if an attacker has access to my email or physical access to my computer, isn't token-based password reset equally vulnerable, as the attacker could simply request a new link?