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A very similar question was asked herehere but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP. So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP. So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP. So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

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Anders
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A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.
 

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP.
  So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.
 

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP.
  So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP. So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

added 103 characters in body
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A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP.
So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP.
So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

A very similar question was asked here but it didn't get any reply, so I'm going to ask a new question with some more insights.

The problem of the most common Evil Twin Attack is that the fake AP is unsecured and I've noticed that even with a deauth attack to the actual AP, the client won't connect automatically to the fake AP because of the different 802.1x configuration. The only way would be that the client connects of his own will.

I'm using hostapd to create the fake AP.
So, how could I accept the request of authentication even if the passphrase of the client does not match the one set in the configuration file of the fake AP (hostapd.conf)?

Because the PSK generated from the fake AP would be different from the one generated by the client.

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