It is my understanding that TLS Inspection can be carried out of two different ways:

• 1st Approach: Using a proxy server which negotiates TLS with both ends.
  • In this scenario, there would be 2 different TLS channels (Client <-> Proxy <-> Server)
  • If non-standard TLS implementations are used by the client/server or specific requirements need to be met in TLS negotiation, the Proxy would need to have specific features enabling that.
• 2nd Approach: Using an intermediate element containing the secrets needed to decrypt TLS shared key negotiation (e.g. private key associated to server's certificate) with the ability to re-encrypt (by using server's certificate) and forward the traffic to the server.
  • In this scenario, Client and Server would not see the intermediate server and it would essentially be a unique TLS channel, even if the intermediate element can see and block suspicious traffic.
  • Intermediate element would not need to implement further features, as it only acts by listening and forwarding/blocking.

When a cryptosuite implementing DH or ECDH is used over a TLS communication, is it possible to make use of the 2nd Approach? From what I know, Key Exchange in DH makes infeasible for an "eavesdropper" to figure what is the shared secret, as private keys are only used as a mean to authenticate the server.

Depending on the cryptosuite used, would TLS Inspection be restricted to the 1st Approach?

It is my understanding that TLS Inspection can be carried out of two different ways:

• 1st Approach: Using a proxy server which negotiates TLS with both ends.
  • In this scenario, there would be 2 different TLS channels (Client <-> Proxy <-> Server)
  • If non-standard TLS implementations are used by the client/server or specific requirements need to be met in TLS negotiation, the Proxy would need to have specific features enabling that.
• 2nd Approach: Using an intermediate element containing the secrets needed to decrypt TLS shared key negotiation (e.g. private key associated to server's certificate) with the ability to re-encrypt (by using server's certificate) and forward the traffic to the server.
  • In this scenario, Client and Server would not see the intermediate server and it would essentially be a unique TLS channel, even if the intermediate element can see and block suspicious traffic.
  • Intermediate element would not need to implement further features, as it only acts by listening and forwarding/blocking.

When a cryptosuite implementing DH or ECDH is used over a TLS communication, is it possible to make use of the 2nd Approach? From what I know, Key Exchange in DH makes infeasible for an "eavesdropper" to figure what the shared secret is, as RSA private keys are only used as a mean to authenticate the server.

Depending on the cryptosuite used, would TLS Inspection be restricted to the 1st Approach?

It is my understanding that TLS Inspection can be carried out of two different ways:

• 1st Approach: Using a proxy server which negotiates TLS with both ends.
  • In this scenario, there would be 2 different TLS channels (Client <-> Proxy <-> Server)
  • If non-standard TLS implementations are used by the client/server or specific requirements need to be met in TLS negotiation, the Proxy would need to have specific features enabling that.
• 2nd Approach: Using an intermediate element containing the secrets needed to decrypt TLS shared key negotiation (e.g. private key associated to server's certificate) with the ability to re-encrypt (by using server's certificate) and forward the traffic to the server.
  • In this scenario, Client and Server would not see the intermediate server and it would essentially be a unique TLS channel, even if the intermediate element can see and block suspicious traffic.
  • Intermediate element would not need to implement further features, as it only acts by listening and forwarding/blocking.

When a cryptosuite implementing DH or ECDH is used over a TLS communication, is it possible to make use of the 2nd Approach? From what I know, Key Exchange in DH makes infeasible for an "eavesdropper" to figure how the shared secret, and private keys are only used as a mean to authenticate the server.

Depending on the cryptosuite used, would TLS Inspection be restricted to the 1st Approach?

It is my understanding that TLS Inspection can be carried out of two different ways:

• 1st Approach: Using a proxy server which negotiates TLS with both ends.
  • In this scenario, there would be 2 different TLS channels (Client <-> Proxy <-> Server)
  • If non-standard TLS implementations are used by the client/server or specific requirements need to be met in TLS negotiation, the Proxy would need to have specific features enabling that.
• 2nd Approach: Using an intermediate element containing the secrets needed to decrypt TLS shared key negotiation (e.g. private key associated to server's certificate) with the ability to re-encrypt (by using server's certificate) and forward the traffic to the server.
  • In this scenario, Client and Server would not see the intermediate server and it would essentially be a unique TLS channel, even if the intermediate element can see and block suspicious traffic.
  • Intermediate element would not need to implement further features, as it only acts by listening and forwarding/blocking.

When a cryptosuite implementing DH or ECDH is used over a TLS communication, is it possible to make use of the 2nd Approach? From what I know, Key Exchange in DH makes infeasible for an "eavesdropper" to figure what is the shared secret, as private keys are only used as a mean to authenticate the server.

Depending on the cryptosuite used, would TLS Inspection be restricted to the 1st Approach?