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However, in an authentication scenario, especially for a SSL/TLS session, this might not be a problem. The <keygen> element is the HTML5 way of implementing the second model. … Certificate-based authentication in SSL/TLS is not necessarily "more secure" than other methods of authentication. Certificates allow for separating identification from authentication. …

Some algorithms known under the code names "A3" and "A8" are involved in the authentication. … Things are easier for the attacker if he already broke the first authentication factor (that's why we use two-factor authentication: because one is not enough). …

The trick is too make the "eventually" go beyond the predicted lifetime of the Universe. That's pretty easy because of exponentials: just use a long-enough cookie. Each added bit doubles the number of …

This is why the free-cert dealers also offer paid certificates with some extra characteristics (certs which last longer, certs with wildcard names, extra authentication procedures...): at some point, the …

The short answer is yes. The long answer is also yes. /dev/urandom yields data which is indistinguishable from true randomness, given existing technology. Getting "better" randomness than what /dev/ur …

This provides authentication as long as client and server known each other public keys; therefore, they send their public keys to each other, wrapped in certificates which are signed blobs. …

OpenID is a protocol for authentication while OAuth is for authorization. Authentication is about making sure that the guy you are talking to is indeed who he claims to be. … This schema may or may not be enlightening; but I think this pseudo-authentication is more confusing than anything. OpenID Connect does just that: it abuses OAuth into an authentication protocol. …

From the Wireshark trace on B2, we see that the client is simply not responding at all; after one minute, the server grows impatient and closes the connection. This is probably not a problem of certi …

It is a rather old tradition not to tell people whether specific logins exist or not. This is why Unix or Windows systems, when asking for user credentials, will respond to any error with a generic "w …

If the admin really wants to see your password, then he will be able to do so. He just has to grab it when you send it to the server. If you want to know what password-dependent data is stored on the …

The one and foremost problem with this approach is that in your example, only the first one is actually a syntactically valid email address. The three others are not. This means that one of the two fo …

There are a couple of cipher suites that provide integrity and server authentication but no encryption (e.g. TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256). …

A lone password is not necessarily verifiable by itself. In particular, if the server does things properly, then it stores not the passwords themselves, but the output of a password hashing function c …

Authentication is about proving the identity of a requester. "Identity" can be a specific property or requirement, e.g. … Gathering authorization information before authentication can leak such information to just anybody. …

Begin an authentication procedure with that emulated server. The server asks for, say, the 1st, 5th and 8th letters of the user's password. … In practice, the attacker does not need to really set up a complete virtual machine with snapshots; he can just concentrate on the few kilobytes of code that handle the authentication process. …