I maintain a departmental server hosted on a subdomain of my organizational network, as in department.example.com
.
Both example.com
and department.example.com
use HTTPS, but run on completely different machines, use a different Certificate Authority, and use different key pairs.
department.example.com
(the server which I am over) does not support SSLv2 or SSLv3; it only support TLSv1.0 and above. The version of OpenSSL on this machine is completely up to date.
However, the example.com
subdomain supports SSLv2, and uses a wildcard *.example.com
certificate. It uses an out of date version of OpenSSL.
When I ran my website through the DROWN attack vulnerability checker at https://drownattack.com/#check, it still told me that my website was vulnerable (to a man in the middle attack if I read it correctly). If the server key pairs on my subdomain department.example.com
are completely separate from the example.com
's key pair, my version of OpenSSL is up to date, and I don't support SSLv2, how could I still be vulnerable to the DROWN attack?
Can a "secured" subdomain be vulnerable because of the bad management of the example.com
server? If so, how does this work?