OpenVPN allows the use of their 'reneg-sec' option to renegotiate keys for the data channel at a specified interval. This helped protect against exploits like Sweet32 with 64 bit block ciphers a while ago. Apparently, only 32GB of retrieved data is needed on a 64 bit block to reach the birthday bound for which the cipher becomes unsafe.
However with larger ciphers, this bound becomes increasingly more difficult to achieve, probably up to the realm of impossibility in a practical sense. For example, a 128 bit cipher would need 256 exabytes of data, whilst a 256 bit cipher would need approximately 2.7 * 10^13 exabytes of data, much more data than there was meant to be on the entire internet in 2019. Therefore, when using ciphers of this length, surely key renegotiation is no longer necessary when the amount of data required to exploit it is practically impossible to get from a session?
I've checked some of NordVPN's OpenVPN configurations, and they have their client side reneg-sec option set to 0 to disable the renegotiation whilst using AES-256-GCM as the cipher. This seems to backup my belief that with these larger ciphers comes the deprecation of such an option.
Is my thinking correct? Or are there still other advantages/exploits that using renegotiation every hour or so achieves/protects against? Thanks.