Search Results

I think there are plentiful of sources to answer your question, but to give you the key points from http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/02/crypto-flaw-was-so-glaring-it-may-be-intentional-eavesdroppi …

Both of your approaches essentially describe the same thing: There is some intermediary system which terminates TLS and you have essentially two TLS connections: one from this middlebox to the client …

You don't get the raw bits of only the key when exporting it using openssl ec -pubout but a structure with more information: $ openssl asn1parse -in pub_key.pem -dump 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 89 cons: SEQ …

In case of DHE-RSA the RSA part is only used for authentication that the client speaks with the proper server. While it might be used to detect modifications of the key exchange it will not detect pas …

The key exchange between a client and a relay is not done directly but is wrapped in the onion layers like any other communication: A connection ("stream") through the Tor network gets first build to …

You are assuming that generateKeys is a deterministic operation so that a attacker knowing the DH parameters will generate exactly the same keys. But this is a wrong assumption. The attacker will end …

I don't think you understand fully what you are doing so I try to explain your steps: ...start by establishing a secure connection between the App and the Web Server using Diffie-Hellman.. This …

In order to use ADH (anonymous diffie-hellman) the relevant ciphers need to be enabled by both client and server. This is by default not the case for OpenSSL and for common clients (like browsers) and …

My confusion stems from reading that TLS handshake uses some kind of Diffie-Hellman, when I was certain that the symmetric key was generated by a digest of earlier packets encrypted with clients publ …

Before the key exchange is done the client has to ensure that it is talking to the correct server and not to some active man in the middle which could split the TLS connection into one between client …

I think the reason for using predefined groups is clearly answered at the page your reference: Instead of using pre-configured DH groups, or generating their own with "openssl dhparam", operators sho …

$ openssl ciphers -V ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ... Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD That means the key exchange (Kx) is ECDH, but the authentication part (Au, i.e. the validation of …

... when the client could just create a random symmetric key and encrypt it using the servers asymmetric public key? What you are describing is essentially RSA key exchange which is also availab …

"dh key too small" is about the size of the key in the DH (Diffie Hellman) key exchange. This is unrelated to the size of the RSA key in the certificate. The key in the certificate is only used for au …

If the attacker is able to passively capture data and later gets access to the private key of the certificates (i.e. stealing, heartbleed attack or law enforcement), then the attacker could decode all …